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A PRIMER ON BROKER-DEALER
REGISTRATION*
David A. Lipton**
Broker-dealers play a pivotal role in maintaining the integrity and effi-
ciency of the American securities markets. By serving public investors, they
effect securities transactions, provide investment advice, take custody of se-
curities and funds, extend credit, and even exercise investment discretion.
Broker nonfeasance or misfeasance can result in harm to investors who rely
upon brokers as fiduciaries. Injury to investors can threaten the welfare of
our capital formation markets, as well as our secondary trading markets.
Because of the sensitive role that broker-dealers play in our economy, federal
securities laws have imposed a comprehensive regulatory scheme upon bro-
ker-dealers. This system establishes duties, prohibitions, surveillance mech-
anisms, disclosure requirements, reporting, financial responsibility and
record retention obligations, in addition to sanctions for performance fail-
ures. This regulatory system is imposed only upon those businesses or per-
sons that are required to register as broker-dealers under the federal
securities laws. In order for the regulatory system to function effectively,
those who are subject to registration, and thus the regulatory system, must
be those persons who perform the financially sensitive functions as broker-
dealers which necessitate investor protection. This Article will explore the
question of who is a broker-dealer and, consequently, who is required to
register as a broker-dealer and comply with the regulatory structure.
Initially, the answer to that question appears relatively simple. There is a
generally accepted understanding by the public that a broker-dealer is some-
one who effects securities transactions for customers either on a commission
or mark-up/mark-down basis. Unfortunately, this common understanding
of the broker-dealer does not provide guidance for determining broker status
* Extensive portions of this Article have been excerpted from the first chapter of a
treatise on broker-dealer regulation, scheduled for publication in late 1987 by Clark Boardman
Co., Ltd. The publisher retains the copyright on that material. Portions of the chapter to
appear in the treatise have not been included in this article for reasons of economy of space.
The excluded sections deal with municipal securities brokers, government securities broker-
dealers and banks and brokers.
** Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. B.A.,
1966, Cornell University; M.A., 1968, Columbia University; J.D., 1972, Michigan University.
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in other than the customary securities industry situation. Common under-
standing of the term "broker-dealer" is not useful in determining, for exam-
ple, whether the vice president of an oil and gas mining company whose
duties include distributing investment interests in the business to the public
is a broker-dealer. Other noncustomary candidates for the classification of
broker-dealer may include finders, who on a commission basis, secure inves-
tors for promoters who seek to develop a specific business idea, or companies
that perform back-office services for brokerage firms when such services re-
quire possession by the company of customer securities. The necessary anal-
ysis for situations involving noncustomary broker-dealers is whether the
potential broker-dealer is performing functions that create risks comparable
to those arising from the activities of customary broker-dealers. An exten-
sive body of case law, Securities and Exchange Commission rules, and no-
action letters have evolved in response to these issues. This Article will ex-
plore that body of law and, in addition, will focus upon issues subsidiary to
the question of who is a broker-dealer. These issues include the operation of
intrastate as well as other exemptions from broker-dealer registration, the
need for registration of foreign broker-dealers, the definition of a security
upon which the definition of broker-dealer is dependent, and the need for
broker-dealer registration by banks engaged in securities activities.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The present federal system for the regulation of brokers and dealers did
not spring fully armored from the head of Congress. The Seventy-third
Congress, which enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange
Act or the 1934 Act),' knew how to be quite specific when responding to
many of the securities trading abuses identified in the highly regarded inves-
tigation of the securities industry conducted by the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency.2 However, when Congress first adopted legislation
1. Ch. 404, §§ 1-34, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78kk
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter Exchange Act or the 1934 Act].
2. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S.
REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). The name of this report is traditionally identified
with Ferdinand Pecora, the last of a series of four attorneys who served as counsel to this
subcommittee in its investigation. Id. at 2.
In describing the work of the Senate Committee, James Landis, one of the draftsmen of the
1933 Act, said:
That Committee spread on the record more than the peccadillos of groups of men
involved in the issuance and marketing of securities. It indicted a system as a whole
that had failed miserably in imposing those essential fiduciary standards that should
govern persons whose function it was to handle other people's money.
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30
(1959). Another extensive study of the practices of the securities industry was conducted
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relating to the registration of brokers and dealers, it seemed to hesitate.
The initial congressional approach to broker-dealer registration was to
provide the nascent Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission
or the SEC) with largely unspecified rulemaking discretion regarding trading
activities of brokers and dealers.3 Pursuant to this broad authorization, the
Commission was empowered to provide for (1) the regulation of broker-
dealer transactions, (2) the registration with the Commission of brokers and
dealers, and (3) the registration of securities in which brokers and dealers
trade.4 Excluded from the Commission's authority was the regulation of
broker-dealer activities on national securities exchanges and the registration
of securities traded on those exchanges. Brokers and dealers would trigger
the Commission's authority only if they (1) used the mails or instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce to make or create an over-the-counter market,
(2) allowed another to make or create an over-the-counter market for the
purchase and/or sale of any security, or (3) used any facility of such a
market.5
Regulation of broker-dealer activities on national securities exchanges was
to be conducted by the exchanges themselves. As in the current version of
the 1934 Act, registration of these exchanges with the Commission was re-
quired in order for securities transactions to be lawfully effected on them, or
about the same time by the Twentieth Century Fund. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND,
INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS (1935). This latter report is frequently identified with the
founder of the Twentieth Century Fund, Edward A. Filene.
3. For instance, original § 15 of the Exchange Act reads in relevant portion:
It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and to insure to
investors protection comparable to that provided by and under authority of this title
in the case of national securities exchanges, (1) for any broker or dealer .... to make
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the pur-
pose of making or creating, or enabling another to make or create, a market, other-
wise than on a national securities exchange, for both the purchase and sale of any
security (other than an exempted security or commercial paper, bankers' accept-
ances, or commercial bills, or unregistered securities the market in which is predomi-
nantly intrastate and which have not previously been registered or listed), or (2) for
any broker or dealer to use any facility of any such market. Such rules and regula-
tions may provide for the regulation of all transactions by brokers and dealers on any
such market, for the registration with the Commission of dealers and/or brokers
making or creating such a market, and for the registration of the securities for which
they make or create a market and may make special provision with respect to securi-
ties or specified classes thereof listed, or entitled to unlisted trading privileges, upon
any exchange on the date of the enactment of this title, which securities are not
registered under the provisions of section 12 of this title.
Exchange Act, ch. 404, § 15, 48 Stat. 881, 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
1987]
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for securities transactions to be lawfully reported by the exchange or by any
broker or dealer.6 Registration for exchanges would only be granted or re-
main in force if the exchanges had rules for "expulsion, suspension, or disci-
plining" a member for violating "just and equitable principles of trade."7
Registration of over-the-counter brokers and dealers was not mandated by
the original section 15 of the 1934 Act. Instead, registration of over-the-
counter brokers was one of a number of ways by which the Commission was
authorized to regulate over-the-counter markets generally, which was in-
tended to supplement the regulation of trading on exchanges.' Thus, the
current system of broker-dealer registration began as nothing more than a
legislative suggestion as to how the Commission might exercise the broad
authority it had been granted to supplement regulation of trading by
exchanges.
Shortly after the enactment of the 1934 Act, the Commission heeded Con-
gress' suggestion and began to require the registration of all brokers and
dealers who used the mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce
for the purpose of making a market over-the-counter or who used any facil-
ity of the over-the-counter market. The registration of 5,088 brokers and
dealers became effective on January 1, 1936.9
Two years after enacting the 1934 Act, Congress codified the rules and
6. Section 78e of the Exchange Act states in relevant portion:
It shall be unlawful for any broker, dealer, or exchange, directly or indirectly, to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the
purpose of using any facility of an exchange.., to effect any transaction in a security,
or to report any such transaction, unless such exchange (1) is registered as a national
securities exchange under section 78f of this title, or (2) is exempted from such regis-
tration upon application by the exchange because, in the opinion of the Commission,
by reason of the limited volume of transactions effected on such exchange, it is not
practicable and not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors to require such registration.
Id.
7. Original § 6(b) of the Exchange Act stated:
No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of the exchange
include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member for con-
duct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, and de-
clare that the willful violation of any provisions of this title or any rule or regulation
thereunder shall be considered conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equi-
table principles of trade.
Exchange Act, ch. 404, § 6(b), 48 Stat. 881, 886 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)).
8. The Commission's authority to regulate trading in general on the over-the-counter
market was perceived as a necessity to "forestall widespread evasion of stock exchange regula-
tion by the withdrawal of securities from listing on exchanges, and by transferring trading
therein to 'over-the-counter' markets where manipulative evils could continue to flourish, un-
checked by any regulatory authority." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) (report
to accompany the Senate bill which was to become the Exchange Act).
9. SEC, REPORT ON TRADING IN UNLISTED SECURITIES UPON EXCHANGES 17 (1936).
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regulations that the Commission had adopted to effect registration of bro-
kers and dealers, as well as the Commission's rules regarding denial and
revocation of registration.1o Congress viewed the codification of the regula-
tions requiring registration of brokers and dealers as "an essential supple-
ment to regulation of the exchanges."11 Registration of brokers and dealers
would now be mandatory and was no longer a discretionary matter covered
by Commission rules. Congress also amended the standard for determining
which broker-dealers would activate the regulatory requirements of section
15. The previously existing standard focused upon whether a broker or
dealer made an over-the-counter market in any security or used the facilities
of such a market. 12 The new standard required registration whenever a bro-
ker or dealer effected transactions in, or induced the purchase or sale of,
securities other than on a national securities exchange.13
Notwithstanding the expansive Commission interpretation of the broker-
dealer registration requirements of the 1934 Act, until 1975, brokers and
dealers who traded exclusively on the floor of a national securities exchange
were exempt from registration. Thus, specialists, floor brokers, and floor
traders who conducted their business on the floor of the exchange did not
have to register. In addition, brokers and dealers engaging exclusively in
transactions in municipal securities did not have to register under the Act by
This report was prepared in compliance with the original § 12(f) of the Exchange Act di-
recting the Commission to conduct a study of trading in unlisted securities upon exchanges.
10. Exchange Act, §§ 15(a), (b), & (c), enacted by Pub. L. No. 621, 49 Stat. 1375, 1377-78
(1936). In the legislative hearings that resulted in the 1936 amendments, then SEC Chairman
James M. Landis expressed his thoughts: "[I]t was about time actually to put into legislation
[the Commission's system for registration of brokers and dealers] rather than making it rest
simply upon the regulations of the commission." Unlisted Securities: Hearings on S. 4023
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1936)
(statement of James M. Landis, Chairman, SEC).
11. H.R. REP. No. 2601, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
12. See supra note 3.
13. Exchange Act § 15(a). Although the registration of exchange brokers per se remained
outside of the Commission's authority, as a practical matter, most stock exchange member
firms engaged in some over-the-counter trading and market making. The Commission inter-
preted § 15(a) as authority to require registration of any broker or dealer who engaged in any
over-the-counter transaction, whether or not that broker or dealer was an exchange member.
In a number of instances, the Commission had made clear that effecting any over-the-counter
transactions in nonexempted securities triggered the registration requirement. Adoption of
rule X-15A-3, Exchange Act Release No. 5790, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 76,615 (Oct. 10, 1958) (specialists were required to have an exemption from registra-
tion if they effected any transactions over the counter even if those transactions were effected in
order to maintain a fair and orderly market in the exchange trading of that security); F.W.
Home & Co., 38 S.E.C. 104, 108-09 (1957); Burley & Co., 28 S.E.C. 126, 128 (1948) (any
transactions in nonexempt, over-the-counter securities trigger registration even if the broker's
business was primarily in exempt securities). Thus, the Commission believed that most ex-
change brokers were covered by § 15.
1987]
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virtue of the definition of "exempted securities" in the then-existing section3(a)(12). 14
The Securities Reform Act of 197515 eliminated both of these gaps in the
scheme of broker-dealer registration. Today, the Securities Exchange Act
no longer limits registration to brokers effecting transactions or inducing the
purchase or sale of securities "otherwise than on a national securities ex-
change."16 Even specialists and floor brokers, who trade exclusively on an
exchange, are now required to register. In 1975, the 1934 Act also was re-
vised to amend section 3(a)(12), 7 thereby eliminating the exemption from
regulation provided brokers who traded exclusively in municipal securities.
Under the amended Act, even brokers and dealers engaging exclusively in
transactions in municipal securities need to register.18 The somewhat tenta-
tive start Congress had made forty-one years earlier in initiating a registra-
tion program for broker-dealers had come full cycle, and now constitutes a
comprehensive, mandatory registration system for all brokers and dealers.
II. TODAY
The result of the evolutionary development of section 15(a)(1) of the 1934
Act is that today it is unlawful for any broker or dealer to make use of the
mails or means of instrumentalities of interstate commerce to effect transac-
tions in any security, or to induce or attempt to induce purchase or sale of
any security unless that broker or dealer is registered pursuant to the Act.19
Brokers and dealers whose business is exclusively intrastate and who do not
14. Prior to 1975, § 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act defined exempted securities to include mu-
nicipal securities. 48 Stat. 881, 884 (1934). As remains true today under § 15(a)(l), broker-
dealers effecting transactions exclusively in exempted securities need not register. Thus, prior
to 1975, brokers effecting transactions exclusively in municipal securities did not need to
register.
15. Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
16. This language existed in the pre-1975 version of § 15(a)(l). Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78
Stat. 565, 570 (1964).
17. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 98 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c).
18. The amended 1934 Act also provided a new § 15B for the registration of municipal
securities dealers. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 131 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-4). As a result of these amendments, there were 5,308 broker-dealers registered with the
Commission as of June 30, 1976, compared with 3,546 one year earlier. 42 SEC ANN. REP. 91
(1976).
19. Exchange Act § 15(a)(1), states:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person other than a
natural person or a natural person not associated with a broker or dealer which is a
person other than a natural person (other than such a broker or dealer whose busi-
ness is exclusively intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of a national
securities exchange) to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce
the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted security or commercial
[Vol. 36:899
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use any facility of a national securities exchange are exempt from the regis-
tration requirement. Also, transactions that are exclusively conducted in ex-
empted securities, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial
bills still do not trigger the registration requirements.2 °
Brokers and dealers whose trading activities are solely limited to the floor
of a national securities exchange are no longer exempt from registration.
Similarly, brokers and dealers who trade only in municipal securities are no
longer viewed as trading in exempted securities for purposes of section 15
and, consequently, must register.2 1
The section 15(a)(1) proscriptions barring transactions by nonregistered
brokers and dealers only apply to a broker or dealer who is not a "natural
person" or a natural person who is "not associated with a broker or dealer
which is a person other than a natural person.",2 2 In essence, section
15(a)(1) only requires the registration of brokerage firms or of individual
brokers who are not associated with a brokerage firm. The broker or "regis-
tered representative" who is employed by a brokerage house does not need
to register under section 15(a)(1) because the broker is associated with a
broker or dealer which is other than a natural person and the brokerage
house itself would need to be registered. 2' The registered representative
would have to register with the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD). The NASD's bylaws require registration by all persons associated
with a NASD member.2 4 Since all brokers who register with the SEC must
become members of the NASD, 25 any registered representative employed by
a registered brokerage firm is associated with a NASD member.
Pursuant to section 15(a)(2), the Commission is authorized to exempt spe-
cific brokers and dealers or classes of brokers and dealers from the registra-
tion requirements of section 15(a)(1). 26 These exemptions must be granted
paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) unless such broker or dealer is reg-
istered in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
20. See supra note 14.
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. Exchange Act § 15(a)(1). The phrase "person associated with a broker or dealer" is
defined in § 3(a)(18) of the 1934 Act to include a "partner, officer, director, or branch manager
of such broker or dealer ... [a person] controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with such broker or dealer or any employee of such broker or dealer" whose functions are
other than clerical or ministerial. Id. § 3(a)(18).
23. Id. § 15(a)(l).
24. NASD, By-Laws (CCH) schedule C, §§ II, III, 1753 (May 1985).
25. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
26. Exchange Act § 15(a)(2) states: "Commission, by rule or order, as it deems consistent
with the public interest and the protection of investors, may conditionally or unconditionally
exempt from paragraph (1) of this subsection any broker or dealer or class of brokers or deal-
ers specified in such rule or order." Id.
1987]
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in a manner consistent with "the public interest and the protection of
investors."
2 7
Nearly one dozen terms employed in section 15(a) are defined in section 3
of the 1934 Act.2" Nonetheless, numerous definitive questions have been
raised regarding these defined terms, as well as other terms employed in sec-
tion 15(a) and not defined elsewhere in the 1934 Act. Much case law, as well
as administrative activity regarding the registration requirement, has cen-
tered on these definitional uncertainties.
The significance of the registration process can best be understood in light
of the requirements placed upon brokers and dealers once they register.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF REGISTRATION
Because of the tentative manner in which the current scheme for broker-
dealer registration evolved, Congress has never fully articulated its goals in
requiring broker-dealer registration. To the extent that the purpose of re-
quiring broker-dealer registration was analyzed, Congress perceived the re-
gistration requirement as an element of the overall mechanics of regulation
of trading in over-the-counter securities.29 In turn, regulation of the over-
the-counlar market was perceived as necessary in order to discourage listed
issuers and traders of listed securities from the temptation of avoiding the
discipline of the exchanges.30
27. Id.
28. In Exchange Act § 3, the following terms used within § 15(a) are defined: "exchange"
(§ 3(a)(1)); "facility" (§ 3(a)(2)); "broker" (§ 3(a)(4)); "dealer" (§ 3(a)(5)); "person"
(§ 3(a)(9)); "security" (§ 3(a)(10)); "exempted security" (§ 3(a)(12)); "purchase" (§ 3(a)(13));
"sale" (§ 3(a)(14)); "interstate commerce" (§ 3(a)(17)); "person associated with a broker or
dealer" (§ 3(a)(18)).
29. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1934).
30. Id. at 16. The House Report said:
[The over-the-counter markets] are of vast proportions and they would serve as a
refuge for any business that might seek to escape the discipline of the exchanges; and
the more exacting that discipline, the greater the temptation to escape from it ....
This constitutes the sanction for Federal regulation of over-the-counter dealers and
brokers. To leave the over-the-counter markets out of a regulatory system would be
to destroy the effects of regulating the organized exchanges."
Id. (quoting the report of the Twentieth Century Fund on "Stock Market Control").
In recent years, the Commission has evaluated Congress' purpose in requiring broker-dealer
registration by referring to a statement made in the SEC's Special Study nearly 30 years after
the passage of the 1934 Act. Exchange Act Release No. 20,943, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,621, at 86,822 (May 9, 1984). The statement suggests that "no
amount of disclosure in a prospectus can be effective to protect investors unless the securities
are sold by a salesman who understands and appreciates both the nature of the securities he
sells and his responsibilities to the investor to whom he sells." SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 588
(1963).
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In order to evaluate the intended role of registration in the absence of a
definitive congressional statement, it is necessary to analyze the conse-
quences of registration. Registration as a broker or dealer under section 15
of the 1934 Act triggers numerous other sections of that Act, as well as rules
promulgated pursuant to those sections. In summary, these consequences
generally serve to (1) insure basic competency of registered broker-dealers,
(2) provide the public with information regarding the business and integrity
of broker-dealers, (3) promote financial solvency of broker-dealers, and (4)
subject broker-dealers to the jurisdiction, rules, and oversight of the NASD.
Initially, registration with the Commission requires filing an application
on a standardized form, Form BD.31 Contemporaneous with the filing of an
application for registration, the broker-dealer must file a statement of finan-
cial condition.3 2 Registering broker-dealers and all natural persons associ-
ated with such broker-dealers must meet basic standards of competency and
training.3 3 Broker-dealers may demonstrate satisfaction of these standards
by the performance of registrants and associated persons on examinations
administered by self-regulatory organizations.
Once registered, a broker-dealer is required to comply with specific record
keeping, financial compliance, and financial reporting requirements.3 4 The
record keeping provisions require maintenance of numerous records regard-
ing, among other matters, securities transactions, positions held in securities,
orders received and given, as well as the receipt and disbursement of various
funds.3 5 In addition, there are rules specifying the period of time for which
the specific records must be retained.36 Further, registrants must prepare
and file quarterly financial reports with the Commission (for clearing bro-
kers, the filing period is monthly), as well as certified annual reports.37 The
certified annual reports also must be sent to the registrant's customers.
Registered broker-dealers, as well as nonregistered broker-dealers, are
subject to rigorous net worth and capital requirements.38 The net capital
rule requires brokers to maintain at least a minimum net worth in addition
to a minimum ratio of net capital to total indebtedness.39 Further protection
31. Rule 15b-l-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b-1-1 (1987). Form BD requires the disclosure of
basic business information as well as information about any previous securities acts violations
by the registrant or persons associated with the registrant. Id.
32. Rule 15b-1-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b-1-2 (1987).
33. Exchange Act § 15(b)(7).
34. Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 140.17a-3 (1987).
35. Id.
36. Rule 17a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (1987).
37. Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1987); see also Exchange Act §§ 17(e)(1)(A)-(C).
38. Exchange Act § 15(c)(3); Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1987).
39. Exchange Act § 15(c)(3).
19871
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is provided investors by the Securities Investor Protection Act," which re-
quires all registered brokers to join an insurance program to cover customer
losses in instances of brokerage house failure.
Additionally, if a broker is required to register under the 1934 Act, that
broker must also join the NASD unless he either (1) is an exchange member,
(2) carries no accounts, and (3) conducts only a de minimis business in over-
the-counter securities.41
Furthermore, registration with the Commission subjects the registrant to
Commission discipline42 and inspections. The Commission has a range of
disciplinary actions it may take against brokers for a variety of wrongful acts
such as securities acts violations, felony and misdemeanor convictions which
reflect upon integrity and financial competence, and willfully providing mis-
information on registration applications.43 Registered brokers, as well as
unregistered brokers, are subject to the broker antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act" and the rules promulgated thereunder. Registered brokers are
also subject to the general antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act, which pro-
hibit fraud in the issuance and trading of securities.45 Unlike other individu-
als who trade in securities, however, registered brokers and dealers can
violate the prohibitions of the 1934 Act without utilizing the mails or other
means of interstate communication.46 Mere registration as a broker satisfies
the jurisdictional requirements of these prohibitions.47
IV. WHO MUST REGISTER
A. General
Brokers and dealers are required to register with the Commission if they
use "the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce"
either to effect transactions or to attempt to induce the purchase or sale of
any security other than exempted securities or commercial paper, bankers'
acceptances, or commercial bills.4" To determine which persons are in-
cluded under the registration requirements, it is necessary to assess who is a
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-7811l.
41. Rule 15b9-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1 (1987); see Exchange Act § 15(b)(8). Member-
ship in the NASD subjects a broker to compliance with that association's Rules of Fair Prac-
tice, surveillance, and discipline.
42. Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)-(6).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(5)(4)(B)(i)-(iv).
44. Exchange Act § 15(c)(l)-(2).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
46. Exchange Act § 15(b)(3); Rule 0-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15 (1987).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 15(a)(1).
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broker or a dealer. As discussed,4 9 registration requirements only apply to
the brokerage firm itself or brokers not associated with a brokerage firm.5 o
The "registered representative" employed by a brokerage firm need not reg-
ister with the Commission, but should register with the NASD. 5"
The term "broker" is defined by the 1934 Act to mean "any person en-
gaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others, but does not include a bank."52 The term "dealer" is defined to
mean "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
his own account ... but does not include ... any person insofar as he buys
or sells securities ... not as a part of a regular business.",5 3 The definition
again excludes from its coverage "a bank," as well as any person whose
purchase and sale of securities are not effected "as a part of a regular busi-
ness."54 Both definitions refer to the term "person" and to the phrase "en-
gaged in the business." The term "person" is conveniently defined by the
1934 Act as "a natural person" as well as a "company, government, or polit-
ical subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government."-" The phrase
"engaged in the business," however, is not defined in the 1934 Act.
The distinction between the definitions of broker and dealer often becomes
blurred when evaluating which persons must register pursuant to section 15.
Frequently, in judicial or administrative analysis, both definitions are dis-
cussed, and the person in question is characterized as being a "broker and a
dealer" or a "broker-dealer" without further clarification as to which defini-
tion has been satisfied by the person's activities. 6 At other times, a person is
49. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
50. Exchange Act § 15(a)(1).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 3(a)(4).
53. Id. § 3(a)(5).
54. Exchange Act § 3(a)(5) reads:
The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a
bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either
individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.
Id.
55. Id. § 3(a)(9).
56. See SEC v. Schmidt, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,202
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); May-Pac Management (Henry Coppelt), SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 20,
1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Joseph McCulley, SEC No-Action
Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,982, at 82,111 (Sept. 1,
1972)
This blurring of the distinction between brokers and dealers is consistent with the treatment
afforded these definitions in other contexts. At an early point in the history of the 1934 Act,
the courts began to ignore the distinction between brokers and dealers for purposes of deter-
mining liability under § 12(2) of the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D.
Me. 1939), afftd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940); see also Lawler v.
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shown to satisfy only the definition of a broker or only the definition of a
dealer, but is nonetheless referred to as a broker-dealer.- 7 In some instances,
a distinction is drawn between the two definitions and a person is referred to
only as a broker or only as a dealer, as appropriate. 58
B. Engaged in the Business
Central to the definitions of both broker and dealer is the phrase "engaged
in the business" of securities transactions. Unfortunately, the 1934 Act does
not define this term. However, a general understanding of this phrase has
evolved through case law and administrative action, primarily in the form of
no-action letters. Critical to the concept of being engaged in the business of
securities transactions is "regularity of participation."59 The definition of
dealer qualifies engaged in the business by requiring that a person's securities
activities must be a "part of a regular business," while the definition of a
broker is not so qualified. However, attention is not typically paid to this
distinction.' In both instances, regularity is required to be shown for a per-
son to be deemed to be engaged in a securities business.
Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
1969).
57. Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 913 (1968). The court argued that the defendant satisfied the definitions of both
broker and dealer but only provided evidence demonstrating the defendant to be dealer. Id. at
361-62.
58. Castleman & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. CCH 1 80,260 (June 15, 1975); Thomas R. Vorbeck, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 24,
1974) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Ballard & Cordell Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Sept. 30 & Oct. 14, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
59. In determining who was a broker or dealer for purposes of membership in the feder-
ally established Securities Investor Protection Corporation, it was noted that the definition of
both broker and dealer "connote a certain regularity of participation in securities transactions
at key points in the chain of distribution." Massachusetts Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corp., 411 F. Supp. 411, 415 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); see also Eastside Church of Christ, 391 F.2d at 360-62; SEC
v. Hansen, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,426, at 98,119 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
Professor Loss suggests that the phrase "engaged in the business" which is common to the
definition of broker and dealer "connotes a certain regularity of participation in purchasing
and selling activities rather than a few isolated transactions." II L. Loss, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 1295 (1961).
60. Professor Loss suggests that the qualifying phrase "regular business" in the dealer
definition does not alter the need to show regularity of participation in proving the existence of
a dealer or a broker. Id. Another commentator has suggested that "arguably less activity is
required to make one a broker than a dealer." Rice, The Expanding Requirementfor Registra-
tion As "Broker-Dealer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
201, 202 (1974). However, Rice cites no cases or administrative action under federal securities
laws in support of his hypothesis.
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In determining what constitutes regularity of participation, it has been
held that a broker-dealer that solicited investors over a four-year period vio-
lated section 15(a)(1) for failing to register since the broker "had a certain
regularity of participation in securities transactions."' 6, In another instance,
the purchase of several million dollars' worth of securities provided sufficient
regularity of purchase to satisfy the phrase "engaged in the business." 62
The Commission staff has found that an individual might not be acting as
a broker or a dealer if, "on a single, isolated basis," the individual advertised
an interest to engage in securities transactions for his own account.63 How-
ever, if the advertising were "engaged in more often than on a single isolated
basis,"' broker-dealer registration would be required. The staff's position is
of further interest here since it demonstrates that merely holding oneself out
as willing to engage in securities transactions will satisfy the need for regu-
larity.65 Even when an individual anticipated selling securities only once per
year, the staff was unable to conclude that the individual would not be re-
quired to register as a broker.66
Regularity is analyzed frequently in terms of past and future experiences.
Officers and directors of a corporate general partner of an oil and gas explo-
ration limited partnership were advised by the staff that they would not be
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities if they sold
units in the limited partnership since in the past they had not engaged in the
offer and sale of other securities. Also, these officers and directors did not
ever intend to sell securities of any other issuer.67 On the contrary, a real
estate investment company, whose employees were to sell units in a limited
partnership, was required to register under section 15(a)(1). 68 The company
previously had made a similar offering of comparable securities and its em-
ployees perhaps were going to be involved in future offerings of similiar se-
curities. The staff concluded that the company appeared to be selling
61. SEC v. National Executive Planners, Ltd., 503 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (M.D.N.C. 1980)
(quoting Massachusetts Fin. Serv&, 411 F. Supp. at 415).
62. UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH)
96,252, at 92,682 (Dec. 8, 1977).
63. Joseph McCulley, SEC No-Action Letter, (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,982, at 82111 (Sept. 1, 1972).
64. Id.
65. See SEC v. Schmidt, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,202
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
66. Wainoco 73 Co. (John B. Ashmun & Thomas B. Grootemaat), SEC No-Action Letter
(July 19, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
67. Robinson Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 19, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File).
68. Inland Realty Inv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 20, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File).
1987]
Catholic University Law Review
securities on a "recurring basis." 69
In order to be engaged in the business of securities transactions, that busi-
ness does not have to be the sole business, nor even the primary business, of
the broker-dealer. The staff found that a real estate developer who proposed
to accept and sell securities in partial payment for real estate lots "as a part
of his regular business activities" would be required to register with the
Commission.7° Similarly, a Swiss banking corporation whose American se-
curity business represented less than three or four percent of its lending busi-
ness was found to be a broker or dealer.7 '
C. Badges of Broker-Dealer Activities
1. Generally
Establishing regularity of business activity satisfies the phrase "engaged in
the business." However, the specific business in which a person is engaged
must satisfy the remainder of the definition of either broker or dealer in
order for registration to be required. Thus, the business engaged in must be
interpreted as constituting either "effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others" or "buying and selling securities" for a person's own
account.72
An analysis of the cases and administrative actions in this area leads to a
distillation of a number of factors, or "badges,",73 of business activities that
would identify a person as a broker-dealer. A distinction is only infrequently
drawn between activities identifiable as broker activities as opposed to dealer
activities, or vice versa.74 Consequently, it is not always necessary to segre-
gate the badges of broker-dealer activities into broker activities and dealer
activities.
Because they are derived from the specific language of the definitions of
broker or dealer, some of the badges are relatively predictable. Other badges
69. Id.
70. Castleman & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,260, at 85,552 (July 15, 1975) (emphasis added). This interpretation is simi-
lar to that taken in regard to the need for registration for investment advisers who engage in
investment advice neither as their sole nor major business activity. Loomis, The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214,
246 (1959). The author was then Director of the SEC's Division of Trading and Exchanges.
71. UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,252, at 92,681 (Dec. 8, 1977).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)-(5).
73. The author would like to credit the use of the term "badge" to Professor Ronald J.
Coffey who creatively employs that term to analyse when a person may be deemed an
underwriter.
74. See supra note 56.
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are not as obvious because they are interpretations of the connotations of the
terms broker and dealer.
Buying and selling securities for one's own account is a badge of broker-
dealer business activity derived from the specific language of the definition.
For instance, when a defendant in the business of assisting churches in rais-
ing money through the issuance and sale of bonds both purchased and sold
these bonds for its account, it was found to have satisfied the definition of
section 3(a)(5). The defendant therefore was in violation of section 15(a)(l)
of the 1934 Act for failing to register as a broker and a dealer.75
However, merely purchasing or selling for one's own account does not
appear to create a need to register. The Commission staff advised an individ-
ual who sought to advertise his interest in purchasing or selling securities for
his own account that this activity, on other than an isolated basis, would
require broker-dealer registration. However, in order to trigger registration
the advertisements needed to "encompass offers to buy as well as to sell."76
Another badge of broker-dealer business activity derived from the specific
language of the definition is effecting transactions for others. Thus, a com-
pany that sold securities "of various issuers on a recurring basis" was found
by the Commission staff to be required to register as a broker or dealer. 7
Similarly, when an officer of the corporate general partner of a limited part-
nership proposed to offer and sell interests in the limited partnership, had
sold securities in the past, and proposed to sell securities in the future, the
staff found that the officer was "engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities. "78
On the contrary, the staff concluded that a business need not register as a
broker-dealer when it assists churches in organizing bond sales programs but
75. Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 361-62 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1968).
76. Joseph McCulley, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,982 (Sept. 1, 1972).
77. Inland Realty Inv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 20, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File); see SEC v. Schmidt, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,202 (Aug. 26, 1971).
78. Wainoco 73 Co. (John B. Ashmun & Thomas B. Grootemaat), SEC No-Action Letter
(July 19, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File). Cf. Sears Roebuck Ac-
ceptance Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (April 15, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library,
No-Action File). Two corporate officers participating in a distribution at Sears were not re-
quired to register as broker-dealers, even though they had been involved in other offerings
within the previous two years. The employees, however, intended to avoid other badges of
broker-dealer activity. For example, they were not going to receive compensation that was in
any way based upon sales volume. Id.
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takes no part in selling efforts.79 Similarly, when consultants provide regis-
tered brokers who sell annuity plans with demographic information about
public employers, insurance policies and pension plans, but do not represent
the brokers "in the effectuation of sales of securities to public employers or
their employees," registration is not required. 0
One badge of broker-dealer activity that is derived from an interpretation
of the connotations in the broker definition is the earning of a commission.
Commission compensation is a hallmark of a broker-customer relationship
and demonstrates success in effecting transactions for the account of others.
Hence, a realty company that proposed selling units of a limited partnership
through employees whose compensation would be "directly related to the
success of the sale of the subject securities" consequently was found by the
Commission staff to be required to register as a broker or dealer under sec-
tion 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act.8 ' On the contrary, when employees of a com-
pany selling interests in a limited partnership, of which the company was a
general partner, only assisted that company in developing and maintaining
relationships with broker-dealers and received "no commission or other vari-
able compensation based upon the volume of sales," the Commission staff
advised that it would not recommend action for nonregistration.8 2
Solicitation of business is considered a badge of securities activity within
the definition of broker. The staff advised an employee who solicited a sale
of stock purchased through an employee stock purchase plan in order to
take advantage of lower commission rates on larger quantity sales that he
would be considered a broker.8 3 The staff's advice was in part based upon
"solicitation of business" by the employee on his own behalf.8 4 Solicitations
in the form of newspaper advertisements may also trigger the need to regis-
ter. For instance, in a proceeding for an injunction, the Commission demon-
strated that a person was a broker-dealer by submitting evidence that he
placed advertisements in a New York City daily newspaper offering savings
79. Christian Bonds, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) $ 78,407 (Aug. 27, 1971).
80. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered (H.C. Copeland & Assoc. Equities Inc.), SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (Apr. 8, 1982) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
81. Inland Realty Inv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 20, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File); see also Jones Intercable, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(Jan. 10, 1980) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
82. Ballard & Cordell Corp. (Edward J. Hardin), SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 14, 1973)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File). This was a follow-up no-action letter.
The earlier letter was available Sept. 30, 1973.
83. Thomas R. Vorbeck, SEC No-Action Letter (March 24, 1974) (LEXIS, Federal Se-
curities Library, No-Action File).
84. Id.
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on commissions.8 5
In determining whether a person had to register as a broker or a dealer,
the Commission staff has examined both past and intended employment in
the securities business. The staff has taken the position that individuals em-
ployed to sell securities who previously were registered representatives in-
deed would be broker-dealers even though their compensation did not
appear to be linked to sales.86 Likewise, in determining that a company in-
tending to distribute units in a limited partnership of which it was the gen-
eral partner must register as a broker-dealer for its current distribution, the
staff noted that the company intended to register as a broker-dealer in the
near future.87
The staff also has employed a number of apparently ad hoc badges in
determining whether a person needs to register as a broker-dealer. These
badges frequently are classifications of overall broker-dealer behavior, rather
than specific broker-dealer activity, and are not used often enough to be con-
sidered customary standards. For instance, the staff has advised that a per-
son selling securities for fellow employees would have to register because the
person's "participation in the transactions may be viewed as a necessary link
in the periodic sale of the securities."88
2. Special Situations
In regard to a number of specific fact patterns, the no-action letters issued
by the Commission staff have developed guidelines or badges as to what con-
stitutes broker or dealer activities. These fact patterns and guidelines are
sufficiently unique to warrant separate discussions, and are not inconsistent
with the general badges of broker-dealer activity. Rather, they apply the
general guidelines to specific relationships.
85. SEC v. Schmidt, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,202
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Also, in the context of a request for a no-action letter, the staff took the
position that mere repeated advertising to buy and sell securities would trigger the broker-
dealer registration requirement. Joseph McCulley, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,982 (Sept. 1, 1972).
86. Jammer Cycle Prods., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [July-Dec. 1973] Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 213, at C-7 (May 10, 1973).
87. Inland Realty Inv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [Jan.-June 1973] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 206, at C-5 (April 10, 1973).
88. Thomas R. Vorbeck, [Jan.-June 1974] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 245, at C-5
(Jan. 27, 1974) (emphasis added). In another instance, a provider of financial services and
advice did not have to register as a broker-dealer because, after providing issuers with advice
regarding bond offerings, it "takes no part in subsequent selling effort" and it "does not train or
direct sales personnel." Christian Bonds, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407, at 80,901 (Aug. 27, 1971) (emphasis added).
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a. Issuers and Issuers' Employees as Broker-Dealers-The Self-Sale
Approach
In frequent instances, issuers sell their own securities through their officers
and employees. Reasons for this practice include economic concerns and an
inability to secure an investment banker's services. At times, these concerns
are a result of uncertainties associated with the offering. Historically, a self-
sale approach by an issuer for distribution of its securities was a common
method for financing a broad range of corporate and financial activities. To-
day, the self-sale approach is most closely identified with limited partner-
ships, frequently having corporate general partners, seeking to finance oil
and gas exploration, agriculture, real estate development, or similar activities
that often might serve as tax shelters.
Regardless of the nature of the venture financed by the self-sale approach,
the issues relevant to broker-dealer registration remain constant: (1)
whether the issuer is a broker or a dealer, and (2) whether the employees are
brokers or dealers.
The first issue would appear to be relatively simple to resolve. An issuer
cannot be a dealer since it is not both buying and selling its securities.89
Furthermore, the issuer should not be considered a broker because the secur-
ities are not sold for the "account of others"; rather, they are being sold by
the issuer for its own account. In fact, the Commission historically has
adopted this analysis in regard to the question of whether the issuer needs to
register.90
Notwithstanding the Commission's long standing recognition of an "is-
suer exemption" for self-selling issuers, no-action requests regarding broker-
dealer registration continue to be made to the Commission staff when issuers
do self-sell91 and the Commission staff continues to assume a no-action pos-
89. Professor Loss explains that under the 1934 Act, an issuer cannot be a dealer because
"even if it is considered to be engaged in the 'business' of selling securities, [it] does not do any
buying as required by the definition." II L. Loss, supra note 59, at 1298 (emphasis in original).
90. In the release originally proposing rule 3a4-1, the Commission stated: "[T]he Act has
customarily been interpreted not to require the issuer [which self-sells] itself to register as
either a broker or a dealer; the issuer would not be effecting transactions for the account of
others nor, generally, would it be engaged in the business of both buying and selling securities
for its own account." Persons Deemed Not to be Brokers, Exchange Act Release No. 13,195,
[Jan.-Mar. 1971] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 387, at G-1 (Jan. 26, 1977).
Two senior members of the Commission's staff of the Division of Market Regulation indi-
cated that virtually since its inception, the Commission has taken this position regarding issu-
ers who self distribute. Ketchum & McQuire, Proposed Rules 3a4-1 and 3a12-9: Broker-
Dealer Registration and Credit Issues in Offerings of Limited Partnership Interests, ALI-ABA,
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION (1985).
91. Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 82,344, at 82,447 (May 4, 1979); Baptist Church Loan
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ture in regard to these inquiries. Generally, the question is raised as an addi-
tional inquiry in the context of a no-action request for nonregistration of
employees of an issuer.9 2 Registration of employees of an issuer, as opposed
to registration of the issuer itself, usually warrants a case-by-case analysis. 9
However, the staff's discussion of the need for registration of an issuer's
employees generally is interwoven with its discussion of the need for regis-
tration of the issuer itself. Therefore, the factors generating the response in
regard to the employees are not distinguished from the factors generating the
response in regard to the issuer.94 As a consequence, it is not always possi-
ble to discern the basis of the staff's exemption from registration for the
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,949, at
81,364 (Oct. 18, 1978); National Rural Util. Coop. Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [Jan.-
June 1976] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 352, at C-5 (Feb. 27, 1976); Arizona-Colorado
Land & Cattle Co., SEC No-Action Letter (June 30, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Li-
brary, No-Action File); Womprop, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 15, 1973) (LEXIS, Fed-
eral Securities Library, No-Action File); John Colter Dev. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [July-
Dec. 1973] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at C-5 (May 11, 1973); Partners in Housing,
SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 29, 1972) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
92. See No-Action Letters, supra note 91. In fewer instances, the request for no action
only relates to the issuer. See Corporate Inv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 20, 1974)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Argonaut Energy Corp., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, [Jan.-June 1973] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 198, at C-6 (Feb. 28, 1973);
DeMatteis Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 78,415, at 80,915 (Sep. 2, 1971).
93. Generally, the staff examines the factors that are discussed below regarding the need
for registration of employees of the issuer.
94. One staff no-action letter advising an issuer that the staff would not recommend Com-
mission action if the issuer did not register (with no mention of employee registration) recited
facts in the letter that appeared to be primarily relevant to registration of the issuer's employ-
ees. Argonaut Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [Jan.-June 1973] Sec. Reg. & L. (BNA)
No. 198 at C-6 (Feb. 28, 1973). This letter could suggest that criteria relevant to employee
registration indeed are relevant to registration of the issuer. An examination of the corre-
sponding letter of inquiry provides a more plausible explanation. The request letter specifically
asked for a no-action response in reference to two officers of the issuer, as well as the issuer
itself. Letter of inquiry from Edward H. Hill (attorney for Argonaut Energy Corp.) (Feb. 28,
1973). The staff's no-action response appropriately analyzed the request in terms of factors
that would impact on the registration of the employees. However, the staff appears to have
partially misidentified the subject of the no-action request in limiting the subject to the issuer,
as opposed to the employees and the issuer.
In another instance in which it advised an issuer that it did not have to register, the staff also
analyzed the issue in terms of factors that appeared relevant primarily to the issuer's employ-
ees. DeMatteis Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,415, at 80,915 (Sep. 2, 1971). There, the letter of inquiry did ask for a no-
action response just in terms of the issuer. The selling practices described were ascribed to the
corporate general partner of the issuer. In fact, the selling practices clearly were those of
employees of the issuer. Thus, the letter of inquiry misidentified the real focus of concern for
broker-dealer registration and the no-action letter adopted the misidentifications. However,
the misidentification was not consequential. The practices described would not have mandated
registration for the employees and the issuer had available the issuer exemption.
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issuer. Readers of no-action letters are left to speculate whether the histori-
cal "issuer's exemption" is the actual basis of the staff's no-action posture
toward the registration of a specific issuer. Alternatively, the no-action be-
ing assumed may be in response to behavior by an issuer's employees when
that behavior is compatible with nonregistration.
In one instance, the staff has made clear that the criteria it utilizes to
determine whether employees are broker-dealers are not relevant in deter-
mining whether an issuer is a broker-dealer. In Corporate Investment Com-
pany (CIC),9 5 the staff indicated that the officers and directors of CIC might
be brokers because they were indeed selling CIC's securities. Although the
activities of the officers and directors possibly warranted their registration,
the staff concluded that CIC itself did not appear to be a broker-dealer.
9 6
Thus, factors suggesting the need for registration of officers and directors do
not necessarily suggest the need for registration of the issuer-employer.
i. Typical Factors
In determining whether employees of an issuer must register when em-
ployees sell an issuer's securities, the Commission staff has established a set
of factors to examine. At times, these factors are clearly identified in no-
action letters as guidelines existing independently of any fact pattern. At
other times, they are only discoverable by a distillation of the staff's recita-
tion of facts in no-action letters. In the latter instance, the staff does not
appear to consistently place the same emphasis on the same factors.
The following factors have specifically been identified by the staff as rele-
vant to a determination of whether an employee of an issuer needs to
register:
(1) Whether the employee is under the issuer's supervision (i.e., whether
he is an employee or an independent contractor). Actual employees are less
likely to be required to register.
(2) Whether the employee's compensation will be linked to the amount
of securities sold or whether it is a fixed compensation. Employees receiving
a fixed compensation are less likely to be required to register.
(3) Whether the employee devotes a substantial portion of his time to
rendering services for the issuer that are not related to the sale of securities.
Employees providing nonsecurities selling services are less likely to be re-
quired to register.
(4) Whether the employee intends to remain with the issuer after com-
95. SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 20, 1974) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Ac-
tion File).
96. Id.
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pletion of the offering. Employees intending to remain are less likely to be
required to register.
(5) Whether the employee participated in the past, or whether the em-
ployee will in the future participate, in other securities offerings by this or
other issuers. Employees participating in other offerings are more likely to
be required to register.
9 7
In examining these considerations, the staff is exploring whether the em-
ployee has to register because he is either (1) an independent salesperson
temporarily calling himself an employee, but is essentially in the business of
effecting transactions for the account of others, or (2) a full-time employee
who, because his selling efforts are of such magnitude or because his com-
pensation is so related to his success in sales, will be considered to be in the
business of effecting transactions for the account of others.
Numerous no-action letters issued by the staff of the Commission have
relied upon many or all of these factors in determining whether to require
broker-dealer registration.9" No single factor appears to be dispositive of the
97. See Corporate Inv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 20, 1974) (LEXIS, Federal Se-
curities Library, No-Action File); Altman Homes, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 2, 1974)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File). These no-action letters are relatively
unique because the staff did not merely recite the relevant facts of a particular situation, but
also specifically enunciated relevant considerations for evaluating the fact pattern.
98. Included among the no-action letters from SEC relying upon the factors listed in the
text are: Wilson & Sons Energy, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 24, 1982) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File); GOE Drilling Partnership 1981, SEC No-Action Letter
(Aug. 8, 1981) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Hershey Harbor Hotel,
Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 11, 1981) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action
File); Golden Corral Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 5, 1980) (LEXIS, Federal Securities
Library, No-Action File); George E. Bates & Assoc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 6, 1979)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (June 3, 1979) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Mid-
land-Guardian Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 27, 1978) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Li-
brary, No-Action File); Baptist Church Loan Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 18, 1978)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); China Trade Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (July 24, 1978) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); National Rural
Util. Coop. Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (May 7, 1976) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Li-
brary, No-Action File); Ashland Fin. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 20, 1974) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Corporate Inv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr.
20, 1974) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Altman Homes, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter (Mar. 2, 1974) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Diplomat
Cattle Management Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 19, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities
Library, No-Action File); Jammer Cycle Prods., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 26, 1973)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); John Colter Dev. Co., SEC No-Action
Letter (July 12, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Arizona-Colorado
Land & Cattle Co., SEC No-Action Letter (June 30, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Li-
brary, No-Action File); Womprop, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 15, 1973) (LEXIS, Fed-
eral Securities Library, No-Action File); Argonaut Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr.
15, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Partners in Housing, SEC No-
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registration issue in any particular instance. Rather, the staff appears to fo-
cus upon the total mix of factors. Additionally, not all factors are discussed
in all no-action letters.
ii. Compensation Based Upon Sales
The most frequently considered factor is the degree to which compensa-
tion reflects success in sales. The Commission has stated that commission
payment "not only raises questions as to whether the recipient is engaged in
the business of effecting [securities] transactions," but that payment also in-
creases the likelihood of "high pressure sales tactics" and "engender[s] other
problems of investor protection." 99 Virtually every no-action letter issued
by the staff dealing with selling efforts by employees of the issuer makes
some reference to the fact that the employees either are or are not compen-
sated on a basis of sales volume. " When analyzing employee compensa-
tion, the staff has examined not merely whether salary reflects the specific
amount of securities sold, but also whether salary beyond the normal
amount is paid to the employee for merely assuming the additional burdens
of selling, o'
The staff's applications of the compensation factor do not appear to be
consistent. In one instance, a proposed compensation scheme pursuant to
which an employee would be paid a percentage of the underwriting commis-
sion for the sale of limited partnership units prevented the staff from taking a
no-action position regarding the employee's nonregistration. °2 This posi-
Action Letter (Dec. 20, 1972) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); The
Woodmoor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,653 (Feb. 3, 1972); Landcom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,176 (May 7, 1971).
99. Exchange Act Release No. 13,195, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,927 (Jan. 21, 1977).
100. Of the 22 no-action letters cited supra note 98, in only one instance, The Woodmoor
Corp., was no specific mention made as to whether the employees were being compensated on
the basis of sales volume. The no-action letter referred to the salesmen as "salaried" and the
staff did not believe registration was necessary. The letter of inquiry suggested that commis-
sions indeed would be paid to the employees.
101. Baptist Church Loan Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 18, 1978) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File).
102. Maurice S. Holcomb, SEC No-Action Letter (July 19, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securi-
ties Library, No-Action File); see Corporate Inv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 20, 1974)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File) (in which the staff indicated that there
was a question as to the need for officers, directors, and employees to register when offering
their employer's securities. The employees were to be compensated on a commission basis);
Ballard & Cordell Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 30 & Oct. 14, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File). In this instance, assuring the staff in a follow-up letter
that employees would not receive commission compensation was a factor, inter alia, considered
by the staff in reversing an earlier decision requiring registration.
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tion was taken even though the employee was to remain with the issuer
"long after" the current distribution."°3 Two years earlier, the staff indi-
cated that it would "not raise any objection" because two officers were to
participate in a distribution of securities by their employer, even though they
were to receive a "10% commission" on sales.'
°4
iii Duties in Addition to Sales
Demonstrating that employees have duties other than the sale of securities
and/or that the employee is fulltime and permanent is a critical aspect to
proving that the employee is other than a broker temporarily serving on an
issuer's payroll. If an employee's sales activities are a small or incidental
aspect of his overall duties or if the employee is a permanent, full-time mem-
ber of the issuer's staff, then the employee is not in the "business" of effect-
ing transactions in securities for the account of others. In some instances
when determining whether an employee need register, the staff has focused
upon the percentage of an employee's time that will be devoted to securities
sales.105 In other instances when making this determination, the staff has
identified the nature of the nonselling and/or selling activities in which an
employee will engage.10 6 Occasionally, when examining whether employees
need to register, the staff has noted that an issuer is paying social security
and unemployment taxes for an employee as well as paying withholding
103. Maurice S. Holcomb, SEC No-Action Letter (July 19, 1973) (available through
LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
104. Landcom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, (1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,176 (May 7, 1971); see The Woodmoor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,653, at 81,389 (Feb. 3, 1972), in which the staff
took a no-action position regarding the need for employees to register even though the letter of
inquiry indicated that the employees would receive "a guaranteed salary of $400 per month
against which commissions are offset." Id. at 81,390 (emphasis added). The staff, perhaps
misreading the letter of inquiry, referred to the employees as "salaried." Id.
105. Golden Corral Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 5, 1980) (LEXIS, Federal Securi-
ties Library, No-Action File) (employee devotes about 10% of his time to duties in connection
with sales); Midland-Guardian Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 27, 1978) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File) (activities in connection with the sales of securities are
"incidental" to employees' primary duties); Baptist Church Loan Corp., SEC No-Action Let-
ter (Nov. 18, 1978) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File) (selling activities to
constitute "less than 5%" of the total time expended by the employees on behalf of the
corporation).
106. Wilson & Sons Energy, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 24, 1982) (LEXIS, Federal Se-
curities Library, No-Action File) (employee responsible for "coordinating and supervising the
offer and sale of Unit's"; "interacting" with assisting broker-dealers; arranging bank financing;
seeking participants in the issuer's oil and gas activities); Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle
Co., SEC No-Action Letter (June 30, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action
File) (employee "will devote a 'significant' portion of his time to the Cattle Feeding Program
when the registration statement becomes effective").
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state and federal income tax. 107 These payments and withholdings evidently
suggest to the staff that employees are being regarded by an issuer as full-
time personnel and not as part-time independent contractors. Additionally,
the staff occasionally has repeated in no-action letters information provided
in letters of inquiry asserting that an employee was not hired expressly to
participate in a sales program and/or that no other new personnel will be
hired by an issuer for the express purpose of assisting in the sale of securi-
ties."OS This information appeared to be provided in the letter of inquiry and
then reiterated by the staff to further demonstrate that the selling effort is
not being conducted by temporary employees who might be independent
salespersons effecting transactions for the accounts of others, but rather by
full-time employees who, in light of existing duties, would not be viewed as
being in the business of effecting transactions for others.
iv. Noninvolvement in Other Securities Activities
Lack of employee participation in selling other securities is mentioned in
staff no-action letters concerning the necessity of broker-dealer registration.
Other participation would assumedly increase the possibility that the em-
ployee, because of his regularity of participation in securities transactions,
would be viewed as being engaged in the "business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others."' 9 The staff has focused upon (1)
specific sales of securities by an employee110 and (2) specific associations of
107. Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Co., SEC No-Action Letter (June 30, 1973)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Partners in Housing, SEC No-Action
Letter (Dec. 29, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
108. National Rural Util. Coop. Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (May 7, 1986) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Diplomat Cattle Management Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Dec. 19, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); John Col-
ter Dev. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (July 12, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-
Action File).
109. In proposing rule 3a4-1, the Commission indicated that repetitive involvement in dis-
tributing securities suggests that an employee is "in the business" of distributing securities.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,195, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,927 (Jan. 21, 1977).
110. Wilson & Sons Energy, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 24, 1982) (LEXIS, Federal Se-
curities Library, No-Action File); GOE Drilling Partnership 1981, SEC No-Action Letter
(Aug. 8, 1981) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Sears Roebuck Accept-
ance Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (June 3, 1979) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-
Action File); Baptist Church Loan Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 18, 1978) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); ITT Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (July 17,
1978) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Midland-Guardian Co., SEC No-
Action Letter (Dec. 27, 1978) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Diplomat
Cattle Management Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 19, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities
Library, No-Action File); Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Co., SEC No-Action Letter (June
30, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
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an employee in the securities industry'. in determining whether there was
sufficient regularity of participation in securities transactions to necessitate
registration.
Although the fact that an employee has not previously sold securities has
been identified as a consideration in staff determinations not to require regis-
tration, the fact that an employee has made sales of securities other than
during the current issuance does not necessarily mean that the employee will
be advised to register.112 After 1977, inquiry letters concerning broker-
dealer registration frequently viewed the two years prior to a current issu-
ance as the relevant time period in which to demonstrate that an employee
has been uninvolved in the sale of securities."13
Although this is not always true, prior employment as a registered repre-
sentative frequently appears to compel the staff to require an employee to
register regardless of whether there was compliance with other guidelines
which would otherwise permit nonregistration." 1 4 However, current em-
ployment of a person as president of an investment advisory company who
was also serving as the corporate general partner of the issuer-limited part-
nership did not compel a determination that the employee must register.'"
v. Other Factors
At times, participation or nonparticipation in a sales situation of regis-
tered broker-dealers, who are not employees of an issuer, is a factor ex-
amined by the staff in determining the need for registration of the issuer's
employees. If employees of an issuer are to supervise broker-dealers, the
employees need to register as broker-dealers.' 16 On one occasion, in advis-
111. George E. Bates & Assoc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 6, 1979) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File); Jammer Cycle Prod., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July
26, 1979) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
112. Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (June 3, 1979) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File). Here, the employees complied with the other
relevant staff guidelines enabling the staff to determine what was not necessary.
113. Id.; ITT Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (July 17, 1978) (LEXIS, Federal Securi-
ties Library, No-Action File). The two year time period was suggested as a guideline by the
Commission in its 1977 release originally proposing rule 3a4-1. In the 1984 reproposed ver-
sion of rule 3a4-1, this time period was reduced to one year. When rule 3a4-1 was adopted in
1985, the time period remained at one year. See infra text accompanying notes 121-42.
114. George E. Bates & Assoc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 6, 1979) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File) (no apparent compliance with other guidelines); Jammer
Cycle Prod., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 26, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library,
No-Action File) (apparent compliance with other guidelines).
115. GOE Drilling Partnership 1981, SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 8, 1981) (LEXIS, Fed-
eral Securities Library, No-Action File).
116. Jammer Cycle Prod., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 26, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal
Securities Library, No-Action File).
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ing employees that registration was not required, the staff observed that sales
would be made without the participation of any brokers or dealers, which
suggests that absence of that participation is relevant to the staff's no-action
position.' 17 In several other instances, however, participation of nonem-
ployee brokers or dealers in selling efforts along with issuer-employees has
not prevented the staff from taking a no-action position regarding the need
for employee registration. 18
Since 1977, some no-action letters119 have indicated whether employees
for whom exemptions from registration were sought were subject to the stat-
utory disqualifications enumerated in section 3(a)(39) of the 1934 Act. The
implication of the notation was that an exemption would be denied if the
employee were subject to a statutory disqualification. This standard was de-
rived from rule 3a4-1 2o which, in its proposed form, contained a provision
excluding from its exemption persons subject to a statutory disqualification.
This standard is intended to discourage exemption from registration for per-
sons who have shown a potential for certain abuses of the securities acts.
vi. Rule 3a4-1
In 1977, in an effort to provide guidance regarding the need for broker-
dealer registration for officers and employees of issuers who distribute their
employer's securities, the Commission proposed rule 3a4-1.121 The pro-
posed rule was not intended as an exclusive safe harbor; however, "only unu-
sual circumstances" would support a conclusion that persons falling outside
of the rule need not register as brokers. 122 Even prior to the adoption of the
rule, the criteria established in the proposed forms of the rule had been cited
by the Commission staff as a basis for positions taken in various no-action
117. Baptist Church Loan Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 81,949 (Oct. 18, 1978).
118. Midland-Guardian Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,947 (Nov. 27, 1978) (the staff did not even mention participation in sales by
broker-dealers-that participation was only discussed in the letter of inquiry); China Trade
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,939 (July
24, 1978); Ballard & Cordell Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 30 & Oct. 14, 1973) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File) (employees were not to be involved in actual sell-
ing efforts, but were to serve as intermediaries between brokers and the issuer).
119. Wilson & Sons Energy, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 24, 1982) (LEXIS, Federal Se-
curities Library, No-Action File); China Trade Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,939, at 81,270 (July 24, 1978).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 121-42.
121. Exchange Act Release No. 13,195, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,927 (Jan. 21, 1977) [hereinafter Rule 3a4-1 Proposing Release].
122. Id.
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letters.123 In 1984, a revised version of rule 3a4-1 was reproposed, 124 and, in
1985, the rule was adopted 25 substantially as proposed in the 1984 version.
The Rule 3a4-1 Adopting Release advised that while the rule "does provide
legal certainty to those persons whose activities meet the conditions of the
[r]ule," 126 compliance with the safe harbor of the rule is not the exclusive
means by which persons associated with an issuer may sell the issuer's secur-
ities without registration as a broker-dealer. The Commission further indi-
cated that the staff would continue to provide interpretive guidance to those
whose activities do not fall clearly within the rule.'2 7
The safe harbor of rule 3a4-1 only provides protection for "associated per-
sons" of the issuer. "' Initially, in order to be eligible for the safe harbor,
associated persons must satisfy three preliminary conditions. 29 The associ-
ated person cannot be (1) subject to a statutory disqualification as defined in
section 3(a)(39) of the 1934 Act,' 30 which is based upon filing misrepresenta-
tions and various securities acts abuses; (2) paid commissions based upon
sales; or (3) associated with a broker-dealer. In regard to the first of the
conditions, the Commission believes that there is added potential for abuse
in the sale of an issuer's securities if persons who are subject to a statutory
disqualification are permitted to "participate without assurance of adequate
supervision or regulatory oversight."'
' 3
'
If the preliminary tests are met, the associated person must comply with
one of three alternative restrictions on his activities in order to satisfy the
safe harbor. First, the associated person satisfies the safe harbor if he limits
his sales efforts to certain specified activities which do not appear to require
123. See supra note 98.
124. See Exchange Act Release No. 20,943, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 83,621 (May 9, 1984) [hereinafter rule 3a4-1 Reproposing Release].
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (1987); Exchange Act Release No. 22,172 (June 27, 1985), 33
SEC Doc. No. 8 at 652 (July 10, 1985) [hereinafter Rule 3a4-1 Adopting Release].
126. Rule 3a4-1 Adopting Release, supra note 125, at 654.
127. Id. at 653.
128. The definition of associated persons includes natural persons who are either partners,
officers, directors, or employees of an issuer, or a corporate general partner of a limited part-
nership that is the issuer, or of a company or partnership that controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control of the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1(c)(1) (1987). Also, partners, of-
ficers, directors, and employees of a registered investment adviser for an investment company
issuer are considered associated persons of the issuer. Id. Financial consultants, attorneys,
accountants, and insurance brokers who assist in the distribution of securities for a fee are not
considered associated persons of the issuer for purposes of the rule; however, the staff may
consider the need for those persons to register on a case-by-case basis. Rule 3a4-1 Adopting
Release, supra note 125, at 654 n.9.
129. Rule 3a4-1(a)(1)-(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1(a)(1)-(3) (1987).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39).
131. Rule 3a4-1 Adopting Release, supra note 125, at 655.
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the protection that broker-dealer registration would provide.' 32 The speci-
fied activities are sales (1) made only to financial institutions and in-
termediaries; (2) of exempted securities, under sections 3(a)(7), 113 3(a)(9), 134
or 3(a)(10) 35 of the 1933 Act from registration under that Act (securities of
issuers in bankruptcy, securities exchanged by the issuer exclusively with its
existing shareholders, or securities issued in an exchange approved after a
hearing, by a court, a government official, or an agency); (3) made in connec-
tion with reorganizations; and (4) pursuant to an employee benefit plan.
One of the assumptions underlying the first alternative is that institutions
and financial intermediaries are sufficiently sophisticated to protect them-
selves. Under this alternative, the Commission did not choose to include all
securities exempt under section 3(a) of the 1933 Act, but instead it chose
only those exemptions insuring that transactions therein would be suffi-
ciently restricted so that the protections of the broker-dealer regulatory
scheme would not be necessary.
136
Under the second alternative, the associated person may sell the issuer's
securities, but he must (1) perform substantial duties for the issuer other
than selling securities; (2) not be or have been within the past twelve months
a broker, a dealer, or an associated person of a broker or dealer investment
advisor; and (3) not participate in the sale of securities for any issuer more
than once every twelve months.'
37
The third alternative permits the associated person to make sales for an
issuer, but requires that the associated person's involvement in the sales be
passive. 138 A seller can only communicate in writing with prospective pur-
chasers when responding to inquiries initiated by potential purchasers and
the written communication must be approved by a partner, an officer, or a
director of the issuer. 139 Communication in the form of "cold calls" are not
permitted."0 When responding to inquiries of potential purchasers, the re-
sponse must be limited to information contained in a registration statement
or other offering document. In addition, the associated person can perform
132. Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(l) (1987).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(7).
134. Id. § 77c(a)(9).
135. Id. § 77c(a)(10).
136. Rule 3a4-1 Adopting Release, supra note 125.
137. Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-l(a)(4)(ii) (1987). In essence, the second
alternative requires that the associated person be a bona fide employee, and not a broker or
dealer who is employed by the issuer. Additionally, the relevant time period for nonparticipa-
tion in the securities industry or in securities transactions has been abbreviated to 12 months
from the two years found in the original proposed rule.
138. Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (1987).
139. Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(iii)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-l(a)(4)(iii)(B) (1987).
140. Id.; Rule 3a4-1 Adopting Release, supra note 125, at 660.
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ministerial and clerical work, such as bookkeeping entries and arranging for
the delivery of securities. 4 ' Under these restrictions, the risks typically as-
sociated with sales activities are limited.
The impact of the rule is to exclude from the safe harbor agents specifi-
cally hired to sell securities and promoters regularly engaged in actively
marketing securities. The safe harbor provided by the rule does not extend
to situations in which an issuer's employees assist buyers and sellers of the
issuer's securities with secondary market transactions. 142
b. Finders
A second instance in which requests are frequently made for exclusion
from the broker-dealer registration requirements arises out of the activities
of independent businesspeople whose role is to find buyers and sellers of
securities, and who do not themselves actually engage in the purchase and
sale of securities. These "finders" are frequently in the business of identify-
ing suitable companies for acquisition or merger in deals that might be struc-
tured through the sale of securities. Other finders or "channelers" may be in
the business of merely directing customers to brokers and dealers, or busi-
nesspersons who are engaged in locating investors for a business seeking to
raise capital. 1
43
In these instances, the rationale for a finder's exemptions is that he does
not satisfy the section 3(a)(4) definition of a broker because he is not "effect-
ing" transactions for others. 1" Rather, the finder argues that his activities
are limited to identifying potential purchasers or sellers of securities and that
the negotiation and execution of the actual transaction is left to others.
i. Typical Factors
Requests for no-action letters for the benefit of finders are frequently ad-
dressed to the Commission staff. Here, the staff has developed a series of
factors, or badges, of broker-dealer activity that are taken into consideration
in evaluating whether a particular finder needs to register as a broker-dealer.
These factors or badges include:
(1) Whether the finder was involved in negotiations for the sale of the
securities. Finders involved in negotiations would more likely be required to
register as a broker-dealer than finders not involved in negotiations.
141. Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(iii)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1(a)(4)(iii)(C) (1987); 33 SEC Doc. No.
8 at 660 (July 10, 1985).
142. Rule 3a4-1 Adopting Release, supra note 125, at 655.
143. See infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text (operative factors in triggering registra-
tion requirement).
144. II L. Loss, supra note 59, at 1299.
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(2) Whether the finder discussed details of the nature of the securities
sold or whether he made any recommendations. Discussions of details and
making recommendations increase the likelihood that registration would be
required.
(3) Whether the finder was compensated on a commission basis linked to
sales. Sales volume linked commissions would increase the likelihood that
registration would be required.
(4) Whether the finder previously was involved in sales of securities.
Previous involvement increases the likelihood that registration would be
required. 145
Essentially, the first three factors are guidelines to determine whether the
finder is in the sort of relationship with a customer that would allow the
customer to be exposed to potential abusive sales practices. The fourth fac-
tor seeks to determine whether there is sufficient reoccurrence of sales of
securities to suggest that the finder is in the "business" of effecting
transactions.
ii. Involvement in Negotiations, Discussing Details, or Making
Recommendations
No single factor appears to be dispositive of the question of whether regis-
tration is required. However, a finder's involvement in negotiations and pro-
viding detailed information or advice appears to be an influential factor.
Broker involvement in negotiations with a customer will virtually always
trigger registration. 146 On the contrary, avoiding negotiations or a discus-
145. See generally Richard S. Appel, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1983) (LEXIS, Fed-
eral Securities Library, No-Action File); Mike Bantuveris, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 23,
1975) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
(H.C. Copeland & Assoc. Equities Inc.), SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 8, 1982) (LEXIS, Fed-
eral Securities Library, No-Action File); John DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter, [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,940 (Oct. 11, 1978); Carl L. Feinstock (John
DiMeno), SEC No-Action Letter, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,067 (Apr. 1, 1979); Financial Charters & Acquisitions Inc. and Hirshen & Assocs., SEC
No-Action Letter (Nov. 25, 1984) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Ful-
ham & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,186 (Dec. 20, 1972); May-Pac Management Co. (Henry Coppelt), SEC No-Action Letter,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 79,679 (Dec. 20, 1973); Russell R.
Miller & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,324 (Aug. 15, 1977); Rodney B. Price and Sharod & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov.
7, 1982) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Ruth H. Quigley, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Finder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 79,474 (July 14, 1973);
Leonard-Trapp & Assocs. Consultants, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,971 (Aug. 25, 1972); Washington Mutual Investors Fund, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,522 (Aug. 30, 1973).
146. Mike Bantuveris, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 23, 1975) (LEXIS, Federal Securities
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sion of details regarding investments or the making of recommendations
usually permits the staff to conclude that a finder does not have to regis-
ter. 14 7 In addition, channelers who select investors in order to introduce
them to brokers may be required to register. For example, a market consult-
ant who invited potential customers to a dinner seminar with a broker was
told that the staff could not sanction the consultant's solicitations in the ab-
sence of registration. 4 The consultant guaranteed the broker the attend-
ance of thirty-five couples at each dinner, trained the telephone personnel,
counseled brokers in seminar "protocol," and counseled mutual fund speak-
ers "to insure maximum results."' 49 The consultant was paid for each
couple in attendance at the seminar. The consultant was also considering a
fee based upon the number of couples who opened accounts with the broker.
In light of these facts, the staff was unable to take a no-action position on
nonregistration. In addition, the staff was concerned with the use of devices
by the consultant that might "whet the appetite" of prospective investors in
a manner inconsistent with the consultant's fiduciary duties.' 50
iii Commission Fee in Proportion to Sale Amount
The Commission staff has taken the position that receipt by a finder of fees
that are paid in proportion to the amount of the sale is a factor that suggests
Library, No-Action File); Fulham & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, (1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,186 (Dec. 20, 1972); May-pac Management Co. (Henry Cop-
pelt), SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) 79,679
(Dec. 20, 1973). In all of these no-action letters, the finder was involved in negotiations and
thus, registration was required.
147. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered (H.C. Copeland & Assoc. Equities Inc.), SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (Apr. 8, 1982) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action file) (finders neither
negotiated nor provided any advice and registration not required); Financial Charters & Ac-
quisitions Inc. and Hirshen & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 25, 1984) (LEXIS, Fed-
eral Securities Library, No-Action file) (finder did not negotiate, recommended, or discuss
aspect of a hedging strategy program to be sold and registration not required); Russell R.
Miller & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
81,324 (Aug. 15, 1977) (finder's role was limited to identifying prospective company for
merger or acquisition and registration not required); Leonard-Trapp & Assocs. Consultants,
SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 25, 1972) (LEXIS Federal Securities Library, No-Action file).
This exemption from registration for nonnegotiating finders has even been provided in in-
stances where the finder is compensated on a commission basis. Russell R. Miller & Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,324 (Aug. 15,
1977) (registration was not required since the finder did not negotiate even though the finder
was paid a fee based upon the consideration paid for company acquired or merged).
148. Leonard-Trapp & Assocs. Consultants, SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 25, 1972)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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that the finder would be required to register as a broker-dealer.1 51 In a
number of instances, however, the staff has found that there was no need for
registration even if a finder was compensated in proportion to the amount of
the sale. In one instance, the finder was in the business of locating insurance
agencies and evaluating them for acquisition.1" 2 The finder was paid a fee
linked to the consideration paid if a subsequent purchase or sale occurred.
However, the acquisition of a specific agency was not necessarily structured
by the sale of securities and the finder played no role in organizing the actual
acquisition. The staff perceived the finder as just a consultant "retained to
bring to bear its knowledge and expertise to the task of identifying an acqui-
sition prospect," and not as a broker. 15 3 Thus, where a finder merely locates
a business and does not serve to effect the transaction, registration is not
required.
In another instance, the staff found that registration was not required even
though the finder was to receive "a commission of about [five] percent," was
locating investors, and was not limiting its activities to identifying business
acquisition prospects. In an initial response to a first letter of inquiry, the
staff determined that registration was required. A second letter of inquiry
provided further information regarding the finder in question and indicated
that the finder had not previously "been engaged in other private placements
wherein he received commissions as a finder or broker.'54 Thus, the absence
of prior involvement in effecting a securities transaction allowed the staff to
ignore the receipt of commissions in a current finder arrangement.
151. Richard S. Appel, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1983) (LEXIS, Federal Securities
Library No-Action file) (registration required because commission was to be paid); Mike Ban-
tuveris, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 23, 1975) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Ac-
tion File) (payment of commission as well as participation in negotiations necessitated
registration); Financial Charters & Acquisitions Inc. and Hirshen & Assocs., SEC No-Action
Letter (Nov. 25, 1984) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File) (registration was
not required for a finder who was to be paid a fee derived in part from the commissions gener-
ated from the transactions the finder facilitated; however, the transactions were to be only in
exempted securities); Fulham & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,186 (Dec. 20, 1972) (payment of commission as well as conducting
negotiations necessitated registration); Ruth H. Quigley, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,474 (July 14, 1973) (payment of commissions
necessitated registration; issue of registration was raised in the context of seeking a determina-
tion regarding the need to become a member in the Securities Investor Protection Corp.).
152. Russell R. Miller & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,324 (Aug. 15, 1977).
153. Id.
154. Carl L. Feinstock (John DiMeno), SEC No-Action Letter, [1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,067 (Apr. 1, 1979).
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iv. Other Experience Selling Securities
The Commission staff has been strongly influenced by a finder's involve-
ment or noninvolvement in other securities sales, as well as by disciplinary
actions arising out of other securities sales, in determining whether a finder
would need to register. For instance, a finder who was to locate investors for
a private offering and who was to be compensated on a commission basis was
initially advised by the staff that he would need to register.' 5 After the staff
was informed that the finder had "not previously been engaged in any pri-
vate or public offerings of securities," however, it determined that registra-
tion would not be necessary."5 6 But a finder who was to locate brokers and
dealers as potential underwriters or participants in private offerings, but was
neither to be involved in actual selling efforts nor to receive any commission
compensation was required to register. 57 In this instance, the finder had
previously been a broker and had been disciplined by the Commission and
the NASD for securities act violations. A history of abusive securities prac-
tices would appear to override compliance with guidelines that are normally
satisfactory in demonstrating a lack of need to register.
v. Trading Information Systems
On a number of occasions, the staff has responded to inquiries regarding
the need to register certain trading information systems as broker-dealers. '
Such trading information systems include a computerized system operated
by a nonprofit corporation to match venture capital investors with entrepre-
neurs.' 59 Another system was a computerized listing of buying and selling
interests in the secondary mortgage market, designed to facilitate mortgage
155. John DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,940 (Oct. 11, 1978); cf Richard S. Appel, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1983)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File) (prior noninvolvement in sale of securi-
ties for others did not overcome the badge of broker-dealer activity established by a commis-
sion fee payment).
156. Carl L. Feinstock (John DiMeno), SEC No-Action Letter, [1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,067 (Apr. 1, 1979).
157. Rodney B. Price and Sharod & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 7, 1982)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
158. USF Mortgage Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,636 (Feb. 21, 1972); Venture Capital Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (Nov. 25, 1985) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Washington Mut.
Investors Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,522 (Aug. 30, 1973).
159.. Venture Capital Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 25, 1985) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
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trading between financial institutions.160 A third inquiry to which the staff
responded concerned a "mailing list" containing the names of interested
buyers and sellers of shares in a mutual fund. 161 The staff concluded that
registration would be required for the trading information systems in mort-
gages and mutual funds, but not for the information system linking venture
capitalists with entrepreneurs. 162 The staff's reasoning was not completely
explicit but the following distinctions can be made. Both the trading systems
in mortgages and mutual fund shares involved trading in established securi-
ties. The trading system matching investors with entrepreneurs did not as-
sist the purchase or sale of specific securities because the investment vehicle
was not yet created. 163 Further, the investor-entrepreneur matching system
was run by a nonprofit corporation which did not charge a fee for its serv-
ices. The nonprofit corporation did require that a $100 donation, designed
to discourage frivolous use of the system,16" be made by listed entrepreneurs
to other nonprofit corporations assisting area business people. On the other
hand, the mortgage trading system did require a subscription fee as well as a
use fee. 165 Although the proposed mutual fund trading interest list did not
require a listing fee, the list would have promoted secondary market liquid-
ity for the mutual fund. 166
In addition to not charging a fee for its service, the non-profit investor-
entrepreneur matching system was not to be in any way involved in the
transactions between the investor and the entrepreneur after the names were
matched. As the Commission staff emphasized, the matching service did not
advise either the investors or the entrepreneurs on the merits of a particular
opportunity, participate in the negotiation of an investment, advise either
participant on how the transaction between the parties might be completed,
160. USF Mortgage Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,636 (Feb. 21, 1972).
161. Washington Mut. Investors Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,522 (Aug. 30, 1973).
162. Id.
163. When a buyer-seller locating service that was to publish a monthly report containing a
list of stocks available for purchase or sale also proposed to provide "instructions on complet-
ing the transactions," the staff concluded that the service must register as a broker. Public Sec.
Locating Serv., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,528 (Sept. 8, 1973).
164. Washington Mut. Investors Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,522 (Aug. 30, 1973).
165. USF Mortgage Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,636 (Feb. 21, 1972).
166. The mutual fund had preferred to provide liquidity through a commitment to redeem
outstanding shares. Washington Mut. Investors Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,522 (Aug. 30, 1973).
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or handle funds or securities regarding the completion of the transaction."'
On the other hand, the mortgage trading system's employees were expected
to discuss offers to trade with both parties. The employees would assist the
making of a match by suggesting adjustments to offers. The matching ser-
vice also planned to "make available to subscribers information as to the
current status of the secondary mortgage market." 168 The mutual fund
trading interest list proposal required the fund's business manager to follow
up agreements to trade by handling the transfer of shares and payments
from buyers to sellers.169 These additional services involving negotiations,
advice, and handling of investors' funds or shares were factors that the staff
considered in concluding that registration would be required for the mutual
fund and the secondary mortgage information trading systems. 7°
Questions may also be raised in regard to trading information systems as
to whether the system constitutes an "exchange," as defined by section
3(a)(1) of the 1934 Act,171 a "securities information processor" or an "exclu-
sive processor" as defined by section 3(a)(22),172 or an "investment adviser"
under section 202(a)(1 1) of the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940.173 Satis-
fying any of these definitions would invoke additional registration concerns.
c. Investment Advisers and Financial Consultants
Investment advisers and providers of financial services frequently seek no-
action positions from the Commission staff regarding their need to register
as broker-dealers. Registration of investment advisers under the provisions
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 does not resolve the issue whether
registration is also required pursuant to section 15(a) of the 1934 Act. Re-
gistration under the 1934 Act has been required if the investment adviser:
(1) executes transactions for its clients; (2) charges fees based upon the
amount of securities transactions effected by its clients; or (3) takes posses-
167. Venture Capital Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 25, 1985) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File). When a buyer-seller locating service proposed to
charge a fee for its monthly publication, the staff advised the service to register as a broker. Id.
(citing Public Sec. Locating Serv., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,528 (Sept. 8, 1973)); see Investors Cooperative Letter, SEC No-Action Let-
ter, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,136 (Apr. 23, 1971).
168. USF Mortgage Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,636 (Feb. 21, 1972).
169. Washington Mut. Investors Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,522 (Aug. 30, 1973).
170. Id.; see USF Mortgage Exchage, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 78,636 (Feb. 21, 1972).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1).
172. Id. § 78c(a)(22)(A)-(B).
173. Id. § 80b-2(a)(l 1).
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sion of its clients' funds or securities.17 4 These factors demonstrate the exist-
ence of a potential for customer abuse by the adviser.
The payment of advisory fees based upon the amount of securities bought
or sold is, by itself, a basis for requiring broker-dealer registration. In Fun-
damental Advisors, Inc., '7 5 an investment adviser proposed to charge an ad-
visory fee equal to three percent of the purchase price of any securities
purchased by its customers as a result of any recommendation made by the
adviser. The advisory contract was to provide that a confirmation of every
securities transaction effected by a customer would be sent by the customer's
broker to the adviser, thereby allowing the adviser to compute his fee.
17 6
Based upon the advisory fee arrangement, the staff indicated that in its view,
the adviser would be required to register as a broker-dealer.77
Also, when advisers maintain possession of customer funds or securities,
concerns over misuse of these funds trigger the need for broker-dealer regis-
tration. For example, an adviser who proposed to publish a monthly list of
new issues and who was to solicit subscriber deposits that were to be depos-
ited in the adviser's account from which monies would be taken to place
orders, was required to register as a broker-dealer. 17 8 Even though the
transaction would not be executed by the adviser and the securities
purchased would be registered in the name of the subscriber and delivered to
the subscriber, the adviser, who would be in possession of customer funds,
174. First Atlantic Inv. Advisory Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 22, 1974) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Fundamental Advisors, Inc., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,568 (Dec. 4, 1971); William
Goldberg, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,990 (Aug. 25, 1972); John Kane, SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,087 (Mar. 10, 1971); Kirr, Marbach & Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,965 (Feb. 6, 1977); Terry J. Mc-
Carthy, SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,927 (July 12, 1974); McGovern Advisory Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 8,
1984) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Edmund C. Mead, SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,323 (June 18, 1971);
B.M. Mecs., SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,999 (Dec. 29, 1970); Gary Robben & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,312 (Nov. 7, 1982).
175. SEC No-Action Letter [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,568
(Dec. 4, 1971).
176. Id.
177. See Edmund C. Mead, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,323 (June 18, 1971) (broker-dealer registration required where brokerage
commissions would be credited against advisory fee); cf Kirr, Marbach & Co., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,965 (Feb. 6, 1977)
(adviser who is paid on a fee basis is not required to register as a broker).
178. John Kane, SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 78,087 (Mar. 10, 1971).
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was required to register. On the other hand, the staff found that an adviser
that managed client assets on a discretionary basis was not required to regis-
ter when the uninvested funds of the clients were to be held in separate trust
accounts in a third-party bank. 1 79 Individual records were to be kept of each
account showing the name and address of the bank, the dates and amounts
of deposits and withdrawals, and the exact amount of the client's beneficial
interest in the account. These safeguards appear to lessen the concerns aris-
ing from an adviser's access to customer funds.
Pooling of customer orders with one another and with an adviser's own
orders under the adviser's name can lead to problems of identification and
segregation of client assets, as well as problems associated with allocation of
aliquot commissions. Thus, when an investment adviser proposed executing
all transactions for its advisory clients in the adviser's name in order to ob-
tain a discount on brokerage commissions, the staff opined that the adviser
would be required to register. 8 ° The adviser also planned to effect transac-
tions for himself at the same time as he effected transactions for his clients.
In order to mitigate the potential problems associated with the pooling of
client orders, advisers institute compensating safeguards designed to segre-
gate client accounts from pooled accounts and to assist in identification of
the client accounts. These safeguards include: (1) advising the executing
broker that specific transactions are being effected for various advisory cli-
ents; (2) providing the executing broker with a list of the adviser's clients; (3)
notifying clients and obtaining their agreement in advance for aggregated
transactions; (4) maintaining completely separate client accounts for all pur-
poses other than executing orders; and (5) avoiding effecting any transac-
tions for the adviser contemporaneously with the client transactions. The
staff has been willing to take a no-action position in regard to an adviser's
need to register as a broker-dealer even when the adviser pools customer
orders, so long as safeguards similar to these are implemented.18 1
The question of the need to register as a broker-dealer also has arisen in
the context of a purchaser representative as defined in rule 501(h) under
regulation D promulgated pursuant to the 1933 Act.182 Where a purchaser
179. McGovern Advisory Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 8, 1984) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File)
180. William Goldberg, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 78,990 (Aug. 25, 1972).
181. Gary Robbens & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 77,312 (Nov. 7, 1982); Kirr, Marbach & Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,965 (Feb. 6, 1977).
182. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.501-.506 (1987). Under rule 506 of regulation D, sales may be made
to purchasers who are inexperienced and unknowledgeable in financial and business matters if
the purchaser is advised by a purchaser representative as defined in rule 501(h). Note I to rule
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representative proposed to advise investors in a regulation D private offering,
the Commission staff advised that it would not recommend enforcement ac-
tion if the representative advised potential investors without registering as a
broker or dealer.'8 3 The advice was based upon assurances that the pur-
chaser representative's fees (1) would be payable irrespective of whether the
representative's offerees purchased securities, and (2) would not be based
upon any securities transaction. 184 Furthermore, assurances were provided
that the purchaser representative assured the staff that it would comply with
the requirements of rule 501.185
Financial service consultants frequently seek no-action positions from the
staff. Financial service consultants provide issuers with advice and assist-
ance in preparing offerings of securities, and historically, broker-dealer regis-
tration has not been necessary for financial consultants so long as their
activities do not include certain identifying badges of broker-dealer status.
Activities that have been found by the staff not to trigger broker-dealer
registration are (1) determining and giving advice on applicable law, (2) ad-
vising upon antifraud concerns, (3) advising an issuer on its financial poten-
tial and recommending methods of financing, (4) advising upon and
preparing appropriate disclosure documents and clearing them with appro-
priate government agencies, (5) providing appropriate debt instruments, (6)
advising the issuer as to necessary charter amendments, (7) making arrange-
ments with a bank for retiring debt instruments and payment of principal
and interest, (8) advising an issuer about clerical work involved in selling
bonds, (9) suggesting to an issuer procedures for selling bonds, (10) sug-
gesting a date of sale, and (11) suggesting investment opportunities for tem-
porarily idle proceeds of an offering.'1 6  On the other hand, sales of
securities, receipt of commission fees based upon securities sold, and holding
funds on securities have been specifically identified as activities in which fi-
501(h) (the rule which defines a "purchaser representative") cautions that a "person acting as a
purchaser representative should consider the applicability of the registration . . . provisions
relating to brokers and dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."
183. Markham Inv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 15, 1984) (LEXIS, Federal Securi-
ties Library, No-Action File).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See generally A & M Financing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 81,946 (Dec. 27, 1978); Benjamin & Lang, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,998 (Aug. 1, 1978); Christian
Bonds, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,407 (Aug. 27, 1971); ELJA Group-Evangelical Consultants, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct.
25, 1984) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File); Stamp Collector Associates,
SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,562 (Nov.
21, 1971).
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nancial counsultants cannot engage and still maintain an exeption from bro-
ker-dealer registration.187
Registration is not required if one only acts as a "consultant" to an issuer
in negotiations with issuer-selected purchasers. However, if the consultant
acts as an "agent" for the issuer in soliciting purchasers for a negotiated sale,
registration would be required.' In one instance, the consultant was per-
mitted to "explain" a capital raising program to volunteer sales persons and
still obtained an exemption from registration.' 8 9 In other instances of pro-
viding a no-action position on registration, however, the Commission staff
indicated that the consultant could neither "train" nor "direct" sales
personnel.' 90
Commission fees as compensation for financial service consultants have
been permitted when the fees are based upon the total amount of securities
offered, as opposed to the amount actually sold. 9'
Similar to investment advisers, a consultant's representations that it would
not hold a client's funds or securities was deemed significant by the staff in
its decision to assume a no-action position. 92 Avoiding the potential for
abuse lessens the need to register as a broker-dealer.
d. Back Office and Ministerial Services
Effecting transactions is an essential requirement of broker activities. Nu-
merous activities, integrally related to the purchase and sale of securities and
the execution of orders, may be subsumed within the term "effecting" trans-
actions. These activities, which are frequently performed in the back office
of a brokerage firm, include accounting, data processing, record keeping,
and custodial transfer.' 93 However, they also can be performed by in-
dependent businesses that provide these back office and ministerial services
187. See No-Action Letters, supra note 186.
188. Benjamin & Lang, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,998 (Aug. 1, 1978).
189. ELJA Group-Evangelical Consultants, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 25, 1984)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
190. Christian Bonds, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407 (Aug. 27, 1971).
191. ELJA Group-Evangelical Consultants, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 25, 1984)
(LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File). There, the staff apparently believed that
the Commission payment would not result in abusive sale techniques because the fees were not
linked to success in sales, but were viewed by the staff as a "flat fee." See Christian Bonds,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407
(Aug. 27, 1971) (fee was described as a percentage of the total offering).
192. Benjamin & Lang, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,998 (Aug. 1, 1978).
193. See infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
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to brokerage firms choosing not to maintain their own support staff.'9 4
When a business provides back office or ministerial services, questions
arise as to whether the business acts as a broker requiring registration under
the 1934 Act. The staff typically employs a number of tests to determine
whether registration is necessary, two of which are general and one specific
in nature. Registration will not be required if the services performed are "of
a purely clerical or ministerial nature."' 95 Registration is necessary, how-
ever, if the provider of services "acts as agent for an issuer or investor in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities."' 96 More objectively, if
the provider of services "maintains custody or possession of funds or securi-
ties at any stage of a securities transaction,"' 97 it must then register as a
broker-dealer.
Consequently, a business that provides services normally performed by
the back office of a brokerage firm was required to register.198 In Clearing
Services, Inc.,99 the business performed complete accounting and record-
keeping services from the time that it received initial trade information to
the time stock was delivered or checks deposited. It held "for safekeeping"
all of the broker-dealer's securities and the securities of its customers, and
transferred and delivered securities in accordance with instructions. 200 In
addition, it maintained trust accounts for each client-broker in which all
funds received from the broker-dealer, the broker's customers, or other bro-
ker-dealers were deposited. The staff found that these services were of a
character that were more than purely clerical or ministerial and required
registration.20'
A corporate subsidiary of a major national brokerage firm that cleared
securities transactions on behalf of various brokers, dealers, and banks was
required to register.2" 2 The subsidiary was involved in the delivery and re-
194. Id.
195. Clearing Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,715, at 81,508-09 (Jan. 3, 1972).
196. ESE Stock Transfer Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,452, at 80,987 (Sept. 13, 1971).
197. Id.; see Interact Mktg. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 78,642, at 81,370 (Jan. 26, 1972); Securities Processing Servs., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 79,060, at 82,295,
82,298 (Sept. 13, 1972).
198. Clearing Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,715, at 81,509-10 (Jan. 3, 1972).
199. Id. at 81,508.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 81,509.
202. Securities Processing Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,060, at 82,296 (Sept. 13, 1972).
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ceipt of municipal securities for its customers and exchanged funds received
for securities delivered. At times, the subsidiary advanced to its customer
the sale price of securities it received for clearance. To insure its financial
security, the subsidiary required its customers to deposit $25,000 in escrow
with it.2°3 Based on these facts, the staff required registration because the
subsidiary received public customers' funds or securities, and also because
"it [was] a significant participant in effecting the securities transactions of its
customers."
204
The possession of customer funds and/or securities is also critical in deter-
mining whether a provider of ministerial services needs to register. In NARe
Life Service Co.,20 5 the business provided regulatory, actuarial, marketing
consulting, and administrative services to assist life insurance companies in
selling variable life insurance and variable annuities. As part of its services,
NARe administered variable life insurance policies, including billing individ-
ual policy holders in the name of the client company, accounting for pre-
mium dollars received, calculating benefits and reserves, and providing
required information on a policy to a policyholder.20 6 The staff found that
"[b]y having supervisory and physical control over funds used in customers'
securities transactions, NARe would be a broker" and, thus, would be re-
quired to register with the Commission.2"7 On the other hand, if custody of
funds or securities is only temporary and if there is no control over the funds
because they are made payable to the account of others, the staff will not
require registration.208
D. Caveat Regarding No-Action Letters
The law that has developed in determining who is a broker-dealer is singu-
larly dependent upon opinions of the Commission staff as expressed in no-
action letters. Perhaps because of the expense of litigation or the expediency
of no-action letters, there are relatively few court cases in this area. In addi-
tion, there are very few Commission releases. The domination of this area
by no-action letter opinions compels a brief discussion regarding the rele-
vance of and difficulties with the advice obtained from these letters.
No-action letters provide the view of the responding staff on whether cer-
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. SEC No-Action Letter (July 26, 1973) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action
File).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Applied Fin. Sys., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,385, at 80,665, 80,668 (Aug. 22, 1971).
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tain conduct described in request letters is in compliance with specified rules
or statutes. All no-action letters have been made publicly available since the
early 1970's.2" 9 The regulatory description of the administrative significance
of no-action letters indicates that the letters "do not constitute an official
expression of the Commission's views;" rather, they are the views of the staff
of the division that prepares the letter.2"' The Commission has sought to
remind the public that no-action letters "are subject to reconsideration and
should not be regarded as precedents binding on the Commission." '211 At
one time, the Commission publicly stated its disagreement with an evalua-
tion of no-action letters that "interpretations" found in no-action letters "are
law." 2
12
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, practitioners place significant reliance
on no-action letters. A former chairperson of the American Bar Associa-
tion's section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law described the
weight that securities lawyers place upon the advice found in no-action
letters:
Normally a no-action letter is requested when the Rule is not clear,
and both client and counsel want the comfort. In such a case,
counsel is not really sure whether the staff is correct when the let-
ter is received. Nevertheless, I think most counsel will advise cli-
ents to proceed in these situations. This decision is often based in
large measure on the fact that most courts, when presented with a
no-action letter, will agree with the letter's position.2"3
A respected authority on administrative law, Professor Kenneth Culp Da-
vis, commented that "some of the most important law of the SEC is embod-
ied in this big batch of no-action letters. This is law."2 4 Even the
Commission has acknowledged that "practitioners might find [no-action]
letters helpful."2 5 Further, it has recognized that no-action letters are
209. Exchange Act Release No. 9006, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 77,921 (Oct. 29, 1970). This release announced the adoption of § 200.81 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, which compels the public availability of no-action letters written in
response to letters of inquiry submitted on or after December 1, 1970.
210. Reg. § 202.1(d), 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1987).
211. Exchange Act Release No. 9006, supra note 209.
212. Exchange Act Release No. 8410, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,606 (Sept. 20, 1968). The Commission was responding to statements made by
Prof. Kenneth Culp Davis. Davis, Panel Discussion, Public Information Act and Interpretative
and Advisory Rulings, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1967). It is significant to note that the Com-
mission's position was taken prior to the adoption of rule 200.81, making no-action letters
publicly available.
213. K. EPPLER, Rule 145 in Practice, 5 PLI INST. SEC. REG. 337 (1974) (statement of
Kenneth Bialkin).
214. See Davis, supra note 212, at 29.
215. Exchange Act Release No. 8410, supra note 212.
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"monitored closely by many issuers, members of the bar and the public." '2 16
Of course, since no-action letters represent the view of the division issuing
the letters,21 7 they provide a reliable indication as to whether the particular
division will recommend Commission action in response to behavior speci-
fied in the request letters.
Whether or not no-action letters are law, they clearly influence judicial
decisions. Courts have cited staff no-action letters, as well as interpretive
releases, as a basis for judicial opinions.218 For example, in ADM Corp. v.
Thomson,219 a district court held that a good faith pledgee of restricted se-
curities was not an underwriter when he sold the collateral in a foreclosure
sale. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed, stat-
ing that "[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission ... would not recom-
mend enforcement proceedings in the circumstances [of the case]." In this
decision, evidence supporting the SEC's position was limited to a series of
staff no-action letters written over a nine-year period. The staff's interpreta-
tion actually was in conflict with other circuit court dicta cited by the
court.2 20 The Thomson court did not need to decide the underwriter status
of the pledgee, and therefore, it is unclear whether it would accord greater
weight to staff no-action letters than to circuit court dicta. However, the
court clearly considered no-action positions to be influential.
In other instances, courts have found that no-action letters provide parties
with a valid basis for otherwise questionable securities activites. For exam-
ple, a broker who had accepted securities pursuant to an option after the
SEC had issued a suspension order for the securities was held not to be in
violation of the suspension order.2 21 The court found that the broker had
relied upon an interpretive release issued by the SEC, in addition to a letter
issued by the staff indicating that objections would not be raised to conduct
similar to that of the brokers.222 The court held that the staff's letter was
"drafted in the knowledge that the industry would place heavy reliance on
it."' 22 3 The court determined that the broker's reliance was justified, appar-
ently because it was written with such knowledge. In Colema Realty Corpo-
ration v. Bibow,2 24 a district court stated that "the confusion and ambiguity
216. Id.
217. Reg. § 202.1(d), 17 C.F.R. § 202(1)(d) (1987).
218. Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. W. Va. 1983); A.D.M. Corp. v. Thomson,
No. 82-1618, slip op. (1st Cir. May 24, 1983).
219. A.D.M. Corp. v. Thomson, No. 82-1618, slip op. (1st Cir. May 24, 1983).
220. Id.
221. H. Kook & Co. v. Scheinman, Hochstin & Trotta, Inc., 414 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1969).
222. Id. at 95-96.
223. Id. at 98.
224. 555 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Conn. 1983).
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surrounding the SEC interpretation" of its own rule, as evidenced by staff
no-action letters, contributed to the court's refusal to follow the Commis-
sion's own interpretation.225
Because no-action and interpretive letters are relevant to securities issues,
in general and particularly to issues in the area of broker-dealer registration,
it is worthwhile to focus upon the problems involved in seeking guidance
from no-action letters. Although no-action letters today are readily avail-
able, the position expounded by any particular no-action letter, or perhaps
even several letters, is often open to debate.
In no-action letters, the staff typically does not provide a rationale for its
position. Frequently, a no-action letter is merely "the expression of a judg-
ment with respect to enforcement policy."'226 The reader is compelled to
speculate which of numerous facts recited in the response and/or letter of
inquiry triggered the staff reaction. Because the staff has placed different
emphasis on the same factors at varying times, comparing the facts cited in
one no-action letter with those in numerous other letters does not necessarily
indicate which factors were most persuasive. 227 A situation in which two
different request letters are written regarding the same matter, and the sec-
ond letter adds a single bit of information beyond the facts described in the
first, is helpful in analyzing the rationale behind specific no-action letters.225
Should the staff reverse its position in the second response from the one it
assumed in its first response, it would appear to be reasonable to conclude
that the factor raised in the second letter influenced the staff's evaluations.
Another problem is that no-action letters do not appear to be uniformly or
carefully prepared. Facts cited in these response letters are sometimes at
variance with those given in the inquiry letters.229 These inconsistencies
heighten the difficulties of interpretation because the reader is not certain
whether the staff's position is in response to the facts as stated in the re-
sponse or in the request. At times, conclusions drawn in no-action responses
appear to flatly contradict conclusions drawn in other no-action
responses.230
Finally, because no-action letters do not refer to other no-action letters or
225. Id. at 1038 n.9.
226. Exchange Act Release No. 8410, supra note 212.
227. See, e.g., supra notes 138, 142, 212, and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., supra note 138.
229. See, e.g., supra note 131, 142.
230. For example, in the area of brokerage sales pursuant to rule 144, the staff has taken an
inconsistent view as to whether a broker can employ itself to sell its own rule 144 securities.
On occasion, the staff has advised that a broker would not be in compliance with rule 144 if it
sold its own securities. National Envtl. Controls, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,183 (Dec. 26, 1972). The staff has also advised that a
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to case law for precedent, a reader cannot discern the relevant criteria in one
letter through an appreciation of relevant criteria in other letters. This
avoidance of precedence is consistent with the stated freedom of the staff to
reconsider its position at any time.2 3" ' However, certain factors appear to
retain their relevance over time and the staff repeatedly relies on them. Yet,
these factors can only be verified by examining an extensive number of let-
ters because no-action letters do not cross-reference to others that support a
common position.
The difficulties involved in analyzing no-action letters in the area of bro-
ker-dealer registration would be greatly diminished if the staff more fre-
quently sought to distill its recent letters and publish interpretive releases.
When the staff's position remains constant, it might further ease the burdens
of lawyers in the field of broker-dealer regulation if the Commission would
codify these positions in its own releases or rules.
V. INTRASTATE EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION
A broker who has a business that is "exclusively intrastate and who does
not make use of any facility of a national securities exchange" does not need
to register pursuant to section 15(a) of the 1934 Act.2 32 This exemption
from registration is restrictively applied.
The term "intrastate" has been narrowly interpreted within the language
of the 1934 Act itself. Intrastate use of a facility of a national securities
exchange, a telephone, another means of communication, or any other inter-
state instrumentality is included within the section 3(a)(17) definition of "in-
terstate commerce. '233 Furthermore, not only is intrastate interpreted
narrowly, all aspects of a transaction must occur intrastate for a transaction
to be included within the category of intrastate. Thus, the intrastate require-
ment was not satisfied when a broker negotiated and agreed upon a sale of
securities within one state, but received payment for the securities from a
second state.2 34
The requirement of exclusivity is also strictly construed. Thus, a transac-
tion must be entirely intrastate, and all of a broker's transactions must be
broker would be in compliance with rule 144 if it sold its own securities. Poldex Chem. Ltd.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Jan. 7, 1975).
231. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
233. Id. § 78c(a)(17). Section 3(a)(17) was amended by the Securities Reform Act of 1975
to include the intrastate use of these factilities of interstate communication within the defini-
tion of interstate commerce. Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 [hereinafter
1975 Act].
234. Guon v. United States, 285 F.2d 140, 144 (8th Cir. 1960).
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intrastate in order to be eligible for the exemption. The Commission has
denied the intrastate exemption when the record showed sales to as few as
two out-of-state residents in one state and one out-of-state resident in an-
other state.235 Furthermore, even interstate sale of exempted securities,
which would not require registration, would make the intrastate exemption
unavailable to a broker whose activities otherwise satisfied the intrastate
requirements.2
36
When dealing with a solely-owned brokerage firm, the Commission will
examine the securities sales of both the brokerage firm and the sole proprie-
tor in determining whether an interstate securities business has been con-
ducted. For instance, when the sole proprietor of an unregistered brokerage
firm sold securities in a "personal" capacity in interstate transactions, the
Commission aggregated these personal sales with the brokerage firm's intra-
state sales and concluded that there was a willful violation of section 15(a) of
the Exchange Act.2 37
If a broker limits its activities to intrastate transactions, but has interstate
business affiliations, it appears that the Commission is unwilling to find that
registration is not required. In In re Capital Funds, 2 38 a broker asserted that
it had discontinued securities transactions in State A before opening its then
sole office in State B. The Commission viewed the fact that the broker was
still qualified as a securities dealer in both States A and B as a factor to be
considered in concluding that the broker's business was not exclusively in-
trastate. In another instance, the staff was disinclined to find that registra-
tion would not be required when a broker, which sold limited partnership
interests only on an intrastate basis, proposed to form, as a general partner,
other limited partnerships that would be interstate in nature and would be
sold exclusively by other registered brokers.2 39 In addition, selling intrastate
for an out-of-state issuer is a factor the Commission has considered in decid-
ing that a broker-dealer's intrastate exemption from registration was
235. In re Capital Funds, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 7398, [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,131 (Aug. 20, 1964), aff'd sub nom. Capital Funds, Inc.
v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965); see In re Professional Investors, Inc., 37 S.E.C. 173
(1956); In re Peoples Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Peoples Sec. Co.,
289 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1961).
236. Iowa Sec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 9, 1972) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Li-
brary, No-Action File); see Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at C-2 (Feb. 16, 1972).
237. In re Chester Richard Koza, 39 S.E.C. 950 (1960). The Commission "rejected the
contention that a person engaged in the securities business as a sole proprietor may treat cer-
tain of his securities transactions as 'individual' transactions not a part of his securities busi-
ness." Id. at 952 (citing In re Lawrence R. Leeby, 32 S.E.C. 307 (1951)).
238. Exchange Act Release No. 7398, supra note 235.
239. Winchester Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,119 (April 1, 1971).
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destroyed.2"
Prior interstate business activities could also present problems for brokers
seeking an intrastate exemption. In Winchester Securities,24' a broker was to
discontinue its interstate transactions and also withdraw its registration.
The staff felt that serious questions would be raised if the broker continued
what was formerly an interstate business on an intrastate basis.242
For purposes of determining whether an intrastate exemption is available
for a broker, the staff is willing to focus on the location of the broker's sales
activities, rather than on the actual residence of the purchasers. Professor
Loss has asserted that in the instance of the intrastate exemption from bro-
ker-dealer registration, unlike the intrastate exemption under section
3(a)(l 1) of the Securities Act,243 the emphasis is upon the physical location
of the broker-dealer's customers, rather than on their legal residence. 2" The
staff therefore was willing to grant a no-action position regarding a broker's
nonregistration when the broker indicated in its letter of inquiry that
although its sales activities would be "exclusively intrastate," it could not
guarantee that it would not "inadvertently" sell to an out-of-state resi-
dent.245 In regard to residence of purchasers, the intrastate exemption for
broker registration is not interpreted as strictly as is the exemption for 1933
Act registration.246
VI. REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN BROKER-DEALERS
The literal language of section 15(a)(1) encompasses within the registra-
tion requirements of the Act foreign broker-dealers who utilize the mails or
other means of interstate commerce to effect transactions in nonexempt se-
curities.247 The 1933 Act definition of "interstate commerce" includes com-
240. In re Professional Inv., Inc., 37 S.E.C. 173, 175-76 (1956). Prof. Loss asserts, how-
ever, that "as long as the buying and selling customers are all in the same state, the issuers of
the securities need not be local companies [in order to receive an exemption]." II L. Loss,
supra note 59, at 1300.
241. SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,119 (April 1, 1971).
242. Id.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1).
244. II L. Loss, supra note 59, at 1299-1300.
245. Corporate Inv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,954 (July 17, 1974).
246. The Commission has held that a single sale to a nonresident destroys an intrastate
exemption for an entire offering. In re Armstrong, Jones & Co., 43 S.E.C. 888, 890-94, reh'g
denied, 43 S.E.C. 993 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); In re Universal Serv. Corp., 37 S.E.C. 559, 563-64
(1957); In re Professional Inv. Inc., 37 S.E.C. 173, 175 (1956).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
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merce between a foreign country and any state.248 Section 30(b) of the 1934
Act does not protect foreign brokers from the registration requirements of
section 15 unless the foreign broker is operating outside of the jurisdiction of
the United States.249
The Commission has indicated that it will not exercise the limits of its
authority under section 15(a)(1). In a 1964 release, the Commission stated
that it would not require registration of a foreign broker-dealer participating
as an underwriter in a distribution of American securities being made
abroad, who limits himself to the following activities:
(1) taking down securities which he sells outside the jurisdiction
of the United States to persons other than American nationals, and
(2) participating solely through his membership in the underwrit-
ing syndicate in activities of the syndicate in the United States such
as, sales to selling group members, stabilizing, overallotment, and
group sales, which activities are carried out for the syndicate by a
managing underwriter or underwriters who are registered with the
Commission.250
However, the Commission has stated that registration would be required of a
foreign broker who engaged in selling securities in the United States or who
purchased securities in the United States for sale to American investors
abroad.2 5' The negative implication of the Commission's statement is that it
would not require registration of brokers who sold securities purchased in
the United States to foreign investors abroad, although it would technically
have the authority to do so. 252 Thus, the emphasis of the Commission's
broker-dealer registration requirements is to protect American investors.
248. 1933 Act § 3(a)(17).
249. Section 30(b) of the 1934 Act reads:
The provisions of this chapter [title 15] or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Id.
The 1934 Act generally, and specifically § 10(b), has been found to apply to transactions in
securities that occur outside of the United States between foreign buyers and sellers when the
subject securities were registered on an American exchange and there was concern about the
welfare of either domestic markets or domestic investors. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200, 206 (2d Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969); see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
250. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Exchange Act Release No.
7366, [1964-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361-63 (July 9, 1964).
251. Id. at 1363.
252. There is also a negative implication that the Commission would not require registra-
tion of foreign broker-dealers who sell foreign purchased securities to Americans abroad. But,
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Selling securities abroad that are bought in the United States does not trigger
registration so long as the sales are to non-American investors.25 3
The Commission staff has indicated that it would not recommend enforce-
ment action against a Canadian broker that sold Canadian securities to
American investors solely through registered American brokers or invest-
ment advisers. 254 The transactions would be exclusively unsolicited. All ac-
counts with the Canadian broker would be in the name of the American
broker, and the Canadian broker would not deal directly with the individual
customer of the American broker.2-5 In promulgating its no-action stance,
the Commission's staff apparently accepted the Canadian broker's argument
that the imposition of a broker-dealer registration requirement on the Cana-
dian broker would not contribute to the protection of American citizens,
who would all be customers of registered American securities
professionals.256
The Commission also has chosen to limit its registration authority of for-
eign brokers in regard to mutual funds. Although, the Commission techni-
cally could have insisted upon the registration of foreign brokers who use the
mails or interstate commerce to buy shares in mutual funds in the United
States for sale abroad,257 it has chosen not to do so. The Commission has
advised that registration would not be required in this instance so long as:
(1) the shares are only sold to foreign nationals outside the United States, its
territories, and possessions, and (2) the foreign broker-dealer "is not directly
or indirectly selling such shares to or acting for the account of an unregis-
tered investment company whose portfolio contains shares issued by open-
end investment companies [mutual funds] registered under the Investment
Company Act."25  Again, the Commission made clear that its concern was
with the protection of American investors. It cautioned that registration
in this instance, unless some aspect of the United States mails or of interstate commerce was
employed, the Commission would not have jurisdiction to require such registration.
253. However, selling foreign securities (or certificates of deposit) within the United States
does trigger the registration requirements since there would be a concern with the protection of
American investors. See R. Allan Neblett, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,327 (June 19, 1971).
254. Wood Gundy, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 78,191 (Dec. 9, 1985).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. No exemption from regulation under § 15(a) is provided for transactions in mutual
fund shares or for non-domestic broker-dealers. If the mails or interstate instrumentalities are
utilized by a broker or a dealer, then § 15(a)(1) requires registration.
258. Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to the Offer and Sale Outside the United
States, Exchange Act Release No. 8907, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 77,828 (June 23, 1970).
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would be required of a foreign broker-dealer who solicits and sells mutual
fund shares to United States nationals, "no matter where located."'259
VII. BROKERS EXEMPTED FROM REGISTRATION
Pursuant to section 15(a)(2) of the Exchange Act,2" the Commission is
authorized to exempt by rule or order any broker or dealer, or class of bro-
kers or dealers, from the broker-dealer registration requirements. The Com-
mission's authority to grant exemptions is limited only to the extent that it
must deem the exemption to be consistent with the public interest and the
protection of investors.
A. Exemption by Rulemaking
The Commission has chosen to exercise sparingly its rulemaking authority
to exempt brokers from registration. Although the Commission has promul-
gated exemption rules pursuant to its authority under section 15(a)(2), some
of its rules do not specifically exempt brokers from registration, but instead
exempt certain securities from the operation of section 15(a)(1) of the Ex-
change Act.261 Because section 15(a) does not require registration of bro-
kers and dealers who effect transactions only in exempted securities,
providing a securities exemption also provides an exemption from registra-
tion for brokers and dealers whose business is conducted exclusively in these
exempted securities.262 Other rules promulgated by the Commission under
section 15(a)(2) specifically provide an exemption from registration for a
broker-dealer.263
Rule 15a-22 1 provides an exemption from the operation of section
15(a)(1) for shares in a corporation representing ownership in cooperative
apartments. To be exempt, shares must be sold by or through a real estate
broker licensed under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the cooperative is
located. Again, brokers who transact business only in shares exempted
under section 15(a)(1) are exempted from registration under section 15(a)(2).
259. Id.
260. Exchange Act § 15(a)(2) reads: "The Commission, by rule or order, as it deems con-
sistent with the public interest and the protection of investors, may conditionally or uncondi-
tionally exempt from paragraph (1) of this subsection [requiring registration] any broker or
dealer or class of brokers or dealers specified in such rule or order." Congress restricted the
Commission's authority to promulgate any exemption or order by requiring that they be "con-
sistent with the public interest and the protection of investors."
261. For a discussion of exempted securities and their impact on broker-dealer regulation,
see infra text accompanying notes 347-94.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a).
263. Rule 15a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-2 (1987).
264. Id.
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Securities bought or sold off the floor of a national securities exchange in a
block by a specialist registered in that security are also exempted from the
operation of section 15(a)(1) pursuant to rule 15a-3. 265 Pursuant to rule
15a-4,2 6 6 "a natural person who is a member of a national securities ex-
change" and whose association with a registered broker-dealer has termi-
nated is exempt from registration as a broker-dealer for a period of forty-five
days after termination for the sole purpose of effecting transactions on the
floor of the exchange. The person seeking this exemption must have filed
with the Commission an application for registration on form BD as a broker-
dealer and he must be in compliance with Commission rules applicable to
broker-dealers.2 67
Rule 15a-4 268 permits brokers who are employed by registered brokerage
firms to continue effecting transactions on an exchange, even though the bro-
ker's employment has been terminated, so long as the broker-employee
promptly seeks his individual registration with the Commission. During the
time a broker-employee is associated with a brokerage house, the broker-
employee need not register with the Commission because section 15(a)(1), by
negative implication, does not require the individual registration of natural
persons associated with registered brokers. If the broker-employee's associa-
tion with the brokerage house is terminated, however, section 15(a)(1), in the
absence of rule 15a-4, would dictate that the unregistered broker-employee
no longer effect transactions in securities on or off an exchange. Rule 15a-4,
however, allows the broker-employee to continue effecting transactions on
an exchange of which he is a member for forty-five days while he pursues his
application for registration.26 9 Within that time, the Commission must
either grant registration or, if denial is contemplated, institute proceedings to
determine whether the application should be denied. Thus, if a broker-em-
ployee files an application for registration under section 15(a)(1) immedi-
ately upon termination of employment with a registered brokerage firm, the
265. Id. § 240.15a-3. The transaction must be approved by the exchange pursuant to its
rules for assisting specialists in maintaining a fair and orderly market in that security on the
specialist's exchange.
266. Id. § 240.15a-4. Rule 15a-4 was adopted in Exchange Act Release No. 12,372, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,467 (Apr. 23, 1976).
267. Additional requirements are that the exchange of which the person is a member must
file with the Commission a statement indicating that it has reviewed the application for regis-
tration and there do not appear to be grounds for the denial of the person's application. 17
C.F.R. § 240.15a-4(a)(2) (1987). Further, the person seeking the exemption cannot be in-
volved in any proceeding pending before the Commission to consider denial of an application
for registration pursuant to § 15(b)(l)(B). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-4(b) (1987).
268. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-4 (1987).
269. Rule 15a-4(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-4(a) (1987).
1987]
Catholic University Law Review
employee should be able to continue service as a broker on an exchange
through the time that his registration is approved.
Rule 15a-5270 provides an exemption from registration for certain lenders
who participate in the Small Business Administration's guaranteed loan pro-
gram. To obtain an exemption, a lender must not engage in the business of
buying and selling securities for its own account except to the extent that the
lender receives notes evidencing loans to small business concerns and sells
the portion of the notes that is guaranteed by the Small Business Adminis-
tration. The sale must be made either through or to a broker or dealer regis-
tered with the Commission or to certain institutional customers. 27' This
rule was intended to encourage participation by qualified lending institutions
in the Small Business Administration's loan program and thus increase the
supply of capital available to eligible small businesses.272
B. Individual Grants of Exemption
Beyond its rulemaking activity, the Commission infrequently exercises its
authority under section 15(a)(2) by granting an exemption from registration
for individual brokers. In addition, the Commission staff occasionally has
used the format of the no-action letter to opine upon whether an exemption,
which can only be granted by the Commission, would be granted in a spe-
cific instance. The basis for the grant or denial of an exemption from regis-
tration is not always made clear, neither in Commission responses to
requests for exemptions nor in staff no-action letters. However, it is clear
that exemptions are only infrequently granted27' and that there is a heavy
burden on the applicant to show the Commission that the grant of an ex-
emption would be in the public interest or for the protection of investors.274
The Commission did grant an exemption in one instance when the appli-
cant proposed to establish numerous safeguards to protect the investors
whom it would serve. 275 The net impact of these safeguards was to provide
protection comparable to the protection provided if the applicant was re-
quired to register. In the fact pattern underlying the exemption, the Na-
tional Association of Investment Clubs (NAIC), a not-for-profit corporation,
270. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-5 (1987).
271. Id.
272. Exchange Act Release No. 12,967, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,806 (Nov. 11, 1976).
273. Curtin, Emerick & Mahoney, P.A., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 12, 1976) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
274. Western Silver Mines & Milling, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 4, 1974) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
275. National Ass'n of Inv. Clubs (Thomas E. O'Hara, chairman), SEC No-Action Letter
(July 13, 1979), (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
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proposed to assist its members in purchasing securities through corporate
dividend reinvestment plans in order to avoid commission payments which
would be high in relation to the small amount of dollars invested by most of
the Association's members.276 In order to protect its investing members,
NAIC provided an escrow account for members' investment funds. Shares
purchased by NAIC were to be issued in the names of the individual mem-
bers. NAIC proposed to provide the Commission staff with quarterly re-
ports including information regarding shares purchased by members, any
complaint letters received concerning the program, and copies of solicitation
letters used by NAIC. NAIC would preserve for six years extensive records
regarding purchases made, monies received, membership applications, and
copies of correspondence and complaints, among other matters.2 77 NAIC
offered to permit the Commission to conduct periodic inspections of its
books, records, and the operations of the proposed program. Finally, NAIC
employees were to be bonded and no person associated with NAIC was to be
subject to a statutory disqualification.2 78 On the basis of these representa-
tions, the Commission concluded that although NAIC would be a broker, it
would be in the public interest to grant NAIC a conditional exemption from
registrations as a broker or dealer.
In another instance when alternative investor protection safeguards were
not provided by an applicant which intended to solicit investor purchases of
stock in large utility companies, the Commission staff advised the applicant
that the staff would not be in a position to recommend that an exemption
from broker-dealer registration be granted.2 79 Cash, Inc., a nonprofit Flor-
ida corporation, sought to inject consumer influence into the decision mak-
ing process of utility companies. It solicited consumers to purchase a share
of stock in a Florida utility company where the purchasers would not be
required to pay a commission but would be required to pledge dividend in-
come to the applicant, Cash, Inc. The letter of inquiry from Cash did not
indicate that any specific investor protections would be implemented. Based
upon the information provided, the staff was not able to conclude that Cash
would not have to register as a broker-dealer.
In evaluating whether to grant an exemption from registration as a bro-
ker-dealer for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC),
the Commission again focused upon the availability of alternative means of
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Cash, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 27, 1979) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Li-
brary, No-Action File).
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providing investor protection.28' The Commission determined that in sell-
ing mortgages and participation interests in mortgages, the FHLMC was
acting both as a broker and a dealer.281  However, the Commission noted
that the FHLMC's financial stability was insured by its status as a govern-
ment instrumentality and its being subject to an annual government audit.
In addition, oversight by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, an independ-
ent governmental agency, was considered to be "an adequate substitute for
the training and experience requirements" contemplated under the broker
registration provisions.282 Beyond its concern with investor protection, the
Commission also noted that the FHLMC's enabling legislation did not re-
flect a congressional intent to require broker-dealer registration.283 Based
upon these considerations, the Commission granted an exemption from re-
gistration under section 15(a)(1) of the Act.
Members of exchanges, even if they only serve other brokers or engage in
just a limited amount of securities business, are not eligible for exemptions
from broker-dealer registration.284 In reference to a request for an exemp-
tion from a floor trader on a regional exchange who effected approximately
twenty-four to thirty-six transactions per year on the exchange, the Commis-
sion noted that the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975285 specifically re-
quired the registration of exchange members such as specialists, floor
traders, and two-dollar brokers who conducted their securities business ex-
clusively on an exchange. 286 The staff took an identical position when it was
asked whether an exchange member that intended to effect executions only
for other brokers would be required to register. The staff indicated that it
would not recommend to the Commission an exemption from registration
for the broker.287
Occasionally, in response to a request for an exemption from registration,
the staff will indicate that it will not recommend enforcement action to the
Commission if the requesting party fails to register as a broker-dealer.288
280. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 8, 1971) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. (William R. Turner), SEC No-Action Letter, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,468, at 86,223 (Mar, 14, 1976).
287. Carmcley Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (June 21, 1976) (LEXIS, Federal Securities
Library, No-Action File).
288. ETIW Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Fed-
eral Securities Library, No-Action File) (the applicant requested an exemption from registra-
tion under § 15(a)(2), arguing that the offer and sale of fractional interests in an Arabian
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Because the staff cannot provide an exemption pursuant to section 15(a)(2),
the staff's no-action letters cannot be viewed as providing technical exemp-
tions from registration. 28 9 However, the net effect of the staff's no-action
response is to permit the inquiring party to conduct the proposed securities
activity without requiring broker-dealer registration.
VIII. BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION AND
DEFINITION OF A SECURITY
Registration of broker-dealers is required under section 15(a)(1) only if
there is any business being conducted in securities. If the interests involved
in a business are not securities, registration is not required. Each of the
definitions of the terms "broker" and "dealer" require that transactions oc-
cur in securities. The term "security" is thus doubly important to the regis-
tration of brokers and dealers. It is critical both in defining a broker and
dealer as well as in defining the activity requiring registration of brokers and
dealers.
Even though the term "security" is central to broker-dealer registration
requirements, questions of broker-dealer registration do not often turn upon
whether the instruments involved in a transaction are indeed securities.
Rather, the question of whether a specific instrument is a security typically is
relevant to broker-dealers only in determining whether there have been vio-
lations of the proscriptions against selling unregistered securities or viola-
tions of antifraud provisions.290  Because the term "securities" plays an
integral role in the definitions of both broker and dealer, and because that
term is examined at times by courts to determine if broker-dealer registra-
tion is required,2 9 1 the definition of securities warrants a brief discussion.29 2
stallion would not constitute the sale of securities); Dart Inds., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 8,
1972) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File) (the applicant requested an exemp-
tion from registration under § 15(a)(2) for the sale of condominiums because the sales would
be made by real estate brokers licensed within the jurisdiction in which the property was lo-
cated and in which the sales would be made.)
289. Pursuant to § 15(a)(2), the Commission is authorized to grant exemptions. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o.
290. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Western Pac. Gold & Silver
Exch. Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,064 (D.C. Nev. 1975).
291. SEC v. National Executive Planners, Ltd., 503 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D.N.C. 1980); SEC
v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd in part and
modified in part, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
292. The issue of what constitutes a security is essentially peripheral to the focus of this
chapter, which is the regulation of broker-dealers. It is a subject matter better addressed in the
context of the regulation of the issuance and sale of securities. For a more complete analysis of
the definition of securities, see 3 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) 19 (1977).
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Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act provides a broad definition of the term
"security." '293 This definition includes traditional securities such as "stocks,
bonds, and debentures," as well as more exotic instruments, such as "collat-
eral-trust certificates" and participations in mineral royalties. The definition
also includes catchall phrases such as "investment contracts" and "profit
sharing agreements." The 1934 Act definition of security is substantially the
same as the definition of security found in section 2(1)294 of the 1933 Act. 295
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has incorporated into the interpre-
tation of the 1934 Act definition of securities, those cases that define securi-
ties, under the 1933 Act.296 Both definitions are preceded by the phrase
"unless the context otherwise requires., 2 97 This phrase provides additional
flexibility in interpreting definitions that are already drafted as multi-pur-
posed vehicles.
The judicial attitude to the term "security" historically has recognized the
need to avoid rigidity in interpretation. In an early decision dealing with the
definition of security, the Supreme Court noted that the term "security"
"embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.
298
293. Section 3(a)(10) reads:
(10) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certif-
icate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency,
or in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or war-
rant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l).
295. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10). The 1934 Act definition does not include the term "evidence of
indebtedness" found in the 1933 Act. The 1934 Act excludes any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker's acceptance with an initial maturity of nine months or less. Also, the 1934 Act
employs a different wording for its definition of securities that are mineral interests.
296. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). The Senate, in adopting the 1934 Act,
indicated that the 1934 Act definition of security was intended to be "substantially the same as
[that contained] in the Securities Act of 1933." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1934).
297. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(I0)
298. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946).
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A. Investment Contracts
In determining what constitutes a security, courts have focused primarily
on the phrase "investment contract." In the watershed case on this matter,
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,2 9 9 the Supreme Court defined an investment con-
tract as "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his
money [2] in a common enterprise and is led [3] to expect profits [4] solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." 3" This four-part defini-
tion established a test for a profit-seeking business venture managed and con-
trolled by those other than the investors. The Howey test has become the
key definition of a security.
Utilizing this test in Howey, the Supreme Court found that the sale of
portions of a citrus tree grove when coupled with a service contract to culti-
vate, harvest, and market the fruit constituted a security. 30 ' The sellers of
the citrus tree units were found to be offering investors "an opportunity to
contribute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise
managed and partly owned by respondents [sellers]. ' a 2 The purchasers
were perceived as being "attracted solely by the prospects of a return on
their investment., 30 3 They had "no desire to occupy the land or to develop
it themselves." Accordingly, the Court concluded that they were purchasing
securities.
Since Howey, the four part investment contract test has been applied to
find securities in offerings to participate in enterprises the focus of which are
as diverse as chinchillas, 3" earthworms, 30 5 scotch whiskey30 6 and managed
customer accounts at brokerage firms.30 7 In each instance, there was a com-
mon enterprise in which investors were seeking profits from a business man-
aged by others.
Several of the elements of the Howey test have been modified or refined
since first enunciated by the Supreme Court. The requirement that the ef-
299. 328 U.S. 293, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946).
300. Id. at 298-99 (bracketed numbers added).
301. Id. at 299-300.
302. Id. at 299.
303. Id. at 300.
304. Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974).
305. Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979).
306. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
307. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). The question
of whether a managed account is indeed a security is of particular relevance to brokers; it
generally arises in the context of attempts by customers to find anti-fraud violations by the
brokerage firm managing the account. Those circuits that are opposed to viewing these ac-
counts as securities often base their opposition on the absence of a common enterprise among
investors. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 457
F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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forts leading to profits come solely from the efforts of others has been less-
ened so that the efforts now need only be "significant., 318 Without this
modification, it was perceived that the Howey test might be evaded merely
"by adding a requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort."' 9
Pursuant to this more pragmatic approach, the sale of interests in a pyrami-
dal promotion enterprise was considered a sale of securities, even though the
investors performed perfunctory roles in the promotion enterprise pursuant
to a script.3 1 0
The element of the Howey test requiring an investment of money has also
been refined by later decisions. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel,3 1' the Supreme Court held that an employer contribution toward a
pension fund could not be equated with an investment by the employee. The
Court found that the contributions could not be viewed as being made "on
behalf" of any employee because there was not a one-for-one relationship
between contributions made by the employer and benefits to be received by
the employee. Furthermore, the employee's contribution was too negligible
to constitute an investment of money. The contribution made on the em-
ployee's behalf pursuant to his employment contract was viewed as "a rela-
tively insignificant part of an employee's total and indivisible compensation
package." '3 12 Thus, after Daniel, in order to satisfy the Howey test, the
money invested in securities must be significant and must be capable of being
segregated out as a distinct sum.
A final element of the Howey test to be refined in later cases is the require-
ment that there be an expectation of profits. Profits have been defined to
include "income yielded by an investment as well as . . . capital apprecia-
tion. In determining whether the sale of cooperative apartment units
constitutes the sale of securities, however, the Supreme Court specifically
excluded from the definition of profit tax savings to the owner of a coopera-
tive apartment that resulted from the deductibility for tax purposes of the
interest paid on the mortgage. These benefits were characterized as "nothing
more than that which is available to any homeowner who pays interest on
his mortgage."'3
14
Additionally, the Court found that the savings realized by cooperative
308. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
309. Id.
310. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
311. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
312. Id. at 560.
313. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975).
314. Id. at 855.
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owners in obtaining housing at below-market rental costs were not accepta-
ble as "profits." Because the low rent was derived from financial subsidies
provided by the New York State government, it could neither be liquidated
into cash nor result from the managerial efforts of others.31 5 Finally, the
income to be derived from leasing by the cooperative of certain commercial
facilities, professional offices, and parking spaces and from its operation of
community washing machines was considered as "far too speculative and
insubstantial" to allow the entire transaction to be viewed as the sale of
securities.3 16
The Daniel opinion also considered the question of what type of profits
would satisfy the Howey test. In Daniel, the pension fund income was de-
rived to a far larger extent from continued employer contributions than from
earnings on its assets. 31 7 The Supreme Court concluded that the benefits
received by the employees from the pension fund could not be considered
profits because they were not derived from the managerial efforts of
others.3 18 In addition, an employee's eligibility for benefits was contingent
on meeting a number of vesting requirements. Receiving "profits" thus de-
pended primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting requirements.
As a consequence, the employee's participation in the pension plan, and thus
his receipt of profits, was found to be "too speculative and insubstantial" to
warrant considering the pension plan as involving the sale of securities. 3 '9
Thus, after Daniel and Forman, to satisfy the Howey test, profits must be
derived from the efforts of others. They must not be too speculative or in-
substantial. They cannot result from government subsidies nor can they
constitute merely tax savings.
There had been some uncertainty as to whether the Howey test was in-
tended to determine whether a particular investment instrument fits into any
of the categories listed in the statutory definition of security or whether it
was a means solely intended for evaluating whether an instrument is an in-
vestment contract. The question is significant because if the Howey test is
not a universal test for what constitutes a security, then, should an instru-
ment not satisfy this test, it still might be found to be a security that is other
than an investment contract.
In the Daniel case, the Court hinted that the Howey test was indeed uni-
versal when it stated that the test "embodies the essential attributes that run
315. Id.
316. Id. at 855-56.
317. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 562 (1979).
318. Id. at 562.
319. Id.
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through all of the Court's decisions defining a security., 320 However, in a
later case, the Court squarely asserted that the Howey test "was designed to
determine whether a particular instrument is an 'investment contract,' not
whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of
'security.' ,321 The Court explained what appeared to be an inconsistency
with its earlier statement by explaining that the Forman statement quoted in
Daniel was made only in response to an argument which asserted that if the
investment instruments were not "stock" or "investment contracts," they at
least were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security.' ,,322 In hind-
sight, the Court observed that all it held in Forman was that once the label
"stock" did not apply, the Howey test would have been appropriate whether
the instrument in question was perceived as an "investment contract" or as
an "instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" Thus, the Court con-
cluded, the Howey test was not universal, but rather designed to determine
the existence of an investment contract or an instrument commonly known
as a security.323
B. Economic Realities
A second frequently utilized mode of analysis for determining the exist-
ence of a security is the "economic realities" test refined by the Supreme
Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 324 as a supplement to
the Howey test. Addressing congressional intentions in adopting the securi-
ties acts, the Court opined that the application of these acts "turn[s] on the
economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto. , 3
25
Noting that the purchasers of cooperative apartments were sold shares
called "stock," the Court concluded that "common sense" suggested that
the purchasers were not misled into believing that they were purchasing in-
vestment securities simply because of the name used to represent an owner-
ship interest. 326 The shares sold did not possess the characteristics of a
security. They provided no right to receive dividends, and they were neither
negotiable nor capable of being hypothecated. Voting was not in proportion
to share ownership. Additionally, because of a resale restriction requiring
320. Id. at 558 n. II (quoting United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975)).
321. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691 (1985) (emphasis in original).
322. Id. at 691 n.5.
323. Id. at 691-92 & n.5.
324. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
325. Id. at 849.
326. Id. at 851.
[Vol. 36:899
Broker-Dealer Registration
that upon termination of occupancy tenants must resell to the cooperative at
cost, the shares could not appreciate in value.327
The Howey test was reconfirmed by the Forman Court to be an integral
element of the economic reality analysis.328 The Howey test determines
whether an instrument is an investment contract by examining whether it
possesses the essential attributes that run through the various Supreme
Court decisions defining a security.3 29 Thus, the Howey test looks to the
substance of an instrument, rather than to the name employed. 33 1 Because
the parties in Forman, in purchasing shares in a cooperative, were seeking
"living quarters for personal use" and not "profits from the efforts of
others," the instrument acquired did not possess the characteristics of a
security.3 3 '
The Forman case provided little guidance as to when the economic reali-
ties test might or must be applied. After the enunciation of the test in For-
man, it was unclear whether an economic realities analysis would have to be
employed each time the issue of the existence of a security was raised. If an
instrument clearly has the characteristics of a security, would a court have to
conduct an economic realities analysis to determine whether the substance of
the transaction suggests that a security is involved?3 32
In 1985, the Supreme Court resolved this matter in Landreth Timber Co.
v. Landreth.333 In Landreth, the Court confirmed that previous cases3 34 had
not been "entirely clear" regarding the issue. The Court indicated that in
the past it had only applied the economic realities analysis when transactions
involved "unusual instruments not easily characterized as 'securities.' "335
327. Id.
328. Id. at 851-52.
329. Id. at 852.
330. Id. at 851-52.
331. Id. at 858.
332. Respondents in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 684 (1985), urged
the Supreme Court to utilize an economic realities test even when the interests in question
possessed all the traditional characteristics of a security. Landreth involved the sale of a busi-
ness by respondents to a purchaser who intended to run the company. Respondents argued
that the economic realities of the transaction demonstrated that the shares sold were not secur-
ities because the purchaser had not "entered into the transaction with the anticipation of earn-
ing profits derived from the efforts of others." Id. at 684-85.
333. Id. at 681.
334. The economic realities test has been employed by the Supreme Court on several occa-
sions other than in Forman: SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), predated
Howey. The Howey Court also stated that it was placing emphasis on the economic reality of a
situation. 328 U.S. at 298, 299. The economic realities test was also employed at times closer
to Forman. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551 (1982).
335. Landreth Timber Co., 471 U.S. at 690.
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Thus, when the instrument involved is "traditional stock," there is no need
"to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether
the Acts apply.",336 On the contrary, when, as in Forman, an instrument has
none of the traditional characteristics of a security, even if labelled "stock,"
the economic realities test should be applied.
At first glance, the Court's explanation of when to apply the economic
realities analysis does not entirely clarify an uncertain situation. Advising
the use of an economic analysis only when the subject instruments are not
"traditional" securities sounds potentially like circular logic. In essence, the
Court might be advising use of the economic realities analysis only upon a
determination, assumedly through economic reality analysis, that one does
not have a traditional security. If this indeed is the Court's advice, situations
in which the economic realities analysis should be employed are essentially
outcome determinative. An instrument that fails the test of traditional se-
curity because of the economic realities test should similarly fail the test of
being a security because the economic realities test again would be
employed.
More likely, the Court had in mind two different economic realities tests.
The first test would be the one employed in Forman to determine whether
the instrument has the characteristics of a security: negotiability, issuance of
dividends, and proportional voting power. Only if that stock characteristics,
economic realities test is failed would the Court then apply the Howey eco-
nomic realities test, which is an investment of money in a common enterprise
with the expectation of profits from the efforts of others.
If one interprets the Court's advice in Landreth as referring to two differ-
ent economic realities tests, it makes sense. The Howey economic realities
test need only be employed if a stock fails the stock characteristics, economic
realities test of Forman.
C. Risk Capital
A number of state courts and a few federal courts have employed a risk
capital test for determining the existence of a security. Under this test, a
security is found to be present whenever an investor places his money at risk
in an enterprise over which he has no managerial control. Perhaps the most
complete articulation of the risk capital test was provided by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, which held that an investment contract is created when:
(1) an offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion
of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's
336. Id.
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promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable under-
standing that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the
initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of
the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exer-
cise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of
the enterprise.33 7
The test permits the possibility of the existence of a security even if there is
no expectation of profits and even if there is some participation by the inves-
tor in the enterprise. 338
Among those courts applying the risk capital test, a consensus is lacking
as to exactly what the test entails. Some jurisdictions only apply the test in
situations involving "start up" capital, as opposed to an infusion of capital to
an ongoing enterprise.3 39 In addition, a number of decisions required that
an enterprise involve speculative risk in order for the test to give an affirma-
tive result. 3 ' The Supreme Court has declined to apply the risk capital
test.34 '
D. Variations in the Applications of Definitional Tests for Securities
In determining whether a security exists, courts do not always restrict
themselves to formal application of the above-described tests, but will occa-
sionally apply variations. The tests have been applied both singly and
jointly. Courts also employ unique tests which are distinguishable from the
above-described tests and are applicable only to specific investment vehicles
or to specific fact patterns.
An example of an application of a unique test for the existence of a secur-
ity can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in Marine Bank v.
Weaver.342 In that case, the Court found that a certificate of deposit of a
federally regulated bank was not a security because (1) the bank issuing the
certificate was subject to a "comprehensive set of regulations governing the
banking industry," and (2) the deposits in the bank were insured by the Fed-
337. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
338. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1961) (the risk capital test was employed to determine whether sale of country club member-
ships constituted the sale of securities under the California Corporation Code). Mr. Steak, Inc.
v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modified on other grounds, 460
F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (the court acknowledged the utility of a risk capital test in determin-
ing whether a franchise constitutes a security).
339. Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
340. Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059,
1065 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1971).
341. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975).
342. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
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eral Deposit Insurance Corporation.343 The focus of the Court's analysis in
Marine Bank was protection of the investor. Finding that the purchaser of
the certificate was "virtually guaranteed payment in full," the Court deter-
mined that the protection of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act was
unnecessary. 34
In regard to a separate loan agreement involved in the Marine case, nego-
tiated "one-on-one" between the parties to the agreement, the Court again
concluded that no security was present. In this instance, the Court found
that there was no intent to publicly trade the instrument in question. The
lending party was given privileges, personal only to the lenders, to use the
borrower's farming facilities. Again, the Court's focus was on unique char-
acteristics of the investment fact pattern in which the transaction arose.345
There, the Court focused its concern on the nature of the distribution of the
investment instruments. The Court concluded that, since the instrument
was not publicly traded, it was not a security. The Court's analysis was
relatively unorthodox since the question of whether or not an instrument is
publicly traded typically is considered in conjunction with a determination
of the need to register, not in conjunction with a determination of whether a
security exists.
The Supreme Court in Weaver acknowledged the unique aspects of its
analysis. It cautioned that in other situations a certificate of deposit might
be deemed to be a security.346 The Court advised that "[e]ach transaction
must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instru-
ments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting
as a whole."347 Thus, in some instances, tests are employed for determining
the existence of a security that are not universal in applicability.
IX. EXEMPTED AND OTHER "EXCLUDED" SECURITIES AFFECTING
BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION
Not all securities transactions trigger the broker-dealer registration re-
quirements of section 15(a)(1). Transactions in certain securities are ex-
cluded from the category of security transactions in which it is unlawful for
a broker or dealer to engage without registration. Securities in which trans-
actions do not require broker-dealer registration include securities specifi-
cally identified as "exempted securities" as well as other securities not so
identified but which function as exempted securities. Collectively, we can
343. Id. at 558.
344. Id. at 558-59.
345. Id. at 559-60.
346. Id. at 560 n.11.
347. Id.
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refer to these exempted and functionally exempted securities as "excluded
securities."
Securities are subject to exclusion by operation of both statute and rule.
Excluded securities are characterized as:
(1) Securities that are defined as "exempted securities" in section
3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act 34 8 and are deemed "exempted" for purposes of sec-
tion 15.
(2) Securities that are specifically exempted from the section 3(a)(10) 350
definition of security. The section 3(a)(10) definition of security specifically
348. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12). Section 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act reads:
The term "exempted security" or "exempted securities" includes securities which
are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, the
United States; such securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the
United States has a direct or indirect interest as shall be designated for exemption by
the Secretary of the Treasury as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors; municipal securities, as defined in section 3(a)(29) of this
title: Provided, however, That municipal securities shall not be deemed to be "ex-
empted securities" for purposes of sections 15, 15A (except subsections (b)(6),
(b)(l 1), and (g)(2) thereof), and 17A of this title; any interest or participation in any
common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a bank exclusively for the collec-
tive investment and reinvestment of assets contributed thereto by such bank in its
capacity as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian; any interest or participation
in a single trust fund, or a collective trust fund maintained by a bank, or any security
arising out of a contract issued by an insurance company, which interest, participa-
tion, or security is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus, pension, or profit-
sharing plan which meets the requirements for qualification under section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, (B) an annuity plan which meets the requirements
for the deduction of the employer's contribution under section 404(a)(2) of such
Code, or (C) a governmental plan as defined in section 414(d) of such code which has
been established by an employer for the exclusive benefit of its employees or their
beneficiaries for the purpose of distributing to such employees or their beneficiaries
the corpus and income of the funds accumulated under such plan, if under such plan
it is impossible, prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to such employ-
ees and their beneficiaries, for any part of the corpus or income to be used for, or
diverted to, purposes other than the exclusive benefit of such employees or their ben-
eficiaries, other than any plan described in clause (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph
(i) which covers employees some or all of whom are employees within the meaning of
section 401(c) of such Code, or (ii) which is a plan funded by an annuity contract
described in section 403(b) of such Code; and such other securities (which may in-
clude, among others, unregistered securities, the market in which is predominantly
intrastate) as the Commission may, by such rules and regulations as it deems consis-
tent with the public interest and the protection of investors, either unconditionally or
upon specified terms and conditions or for stated periods, exempt from the operation
of any one or more provisions of this title which by their terms do not apply to an
"exempted security" or to "exempted securities."
Id. (emphasis in original).
349. Municipal securities are defined as "exempted securities," but not for purposes of
§§ 15, 15A, and 17A of the 1934 Act.
350. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
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excludes "currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's accept-
ance, which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months."
(3) Securities that are not defined as exempted by section 3(a)(12), but
are nonetheless excluded from the operation of section 15(a)(1) by its lan-
guage. Specifically, section 15(a)(1) does not require registration for brokers
and dealers who transact business solely in "commercial paper, bankers' ac-
ceptances, or commercial bills.
' 351
(4) Securities that are exempted for purposes of section 15(a)(1) pursu-
ant to the Commission's rulemaking authority. The Commission has exer-
cised its authority under section 3(a)(12) to exempt certain securities as it
deems "consistent with the public interest and the protection of inves-
tors. '35 2 Pursuant to section 15(a)(2), the Commission also has authority to
exempt a specified class of broker-dealers from the registration requirement
of section 15(a)(1). 35 3 In exercising its latter authority, the Commission has
at times essentially established a class of exempted securities.
A. Exempted Securities
The section 3(a)(12) definition of securities exempted for purposes of sec-
tion 15(a) is complex, and it includes a number of categories of securities:
(1) United States government securities, including any direct obligations
of the government or obligations guaranteed by the government as to princi-
pal or interest. Securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the
government has an interest and that are designated for exemption by the
Secretary of the Treasury are also exempted.3 54
(2) Interests in common trust funds maintained by banks exclusively for
collective investment and reinvestment of assets maintained therein by the
bank as trustee, administrator, executor, or guardian. Also exempted are
interests in single or collective trust funds maintained by a bank.355
(3) Securities arising out of contracts issued by an insurance company in
connection with stock bonus, pension, or profit sharing plans which meet the
qualification requirements of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, an-
nuity plans for which employer contributions are deductible under section
404(a)(2) of the Code, or governmental plans as defined in section 414(d) of
the Code, established for the exclusive benefit of employees. 356
351. Exchange Act § 15(a)(1).
352. Id. § 3(a)(12).
353. Id. § 15(a)(1).
354. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12).
355. Id.
356. Id.
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(4) Securities that the Commission designates as exempted securities. 357
That designation can be unconditional or upon specified terms or for stated
periods. These exemptions may be from one or more provisions of the 1934
Act.
(5) Although municipal securities are included within the section
3(a)(12) definition of exempted securities, since the 1975 Securities Reform
Act,3 58 municipal securities are no longer exempted for purposes of sections
15 and 15A of the 1934 Act. Municipal securities are defined by section
3(a)(29) 35 9 to include direct obligations of a state, political subdivision, or
any agency of a state or political subdivision as well as obligations guaran-
teed as to principal or interest by a state, political subdivision, or agency of a
state or political subdivision. Also included in municipal securities are in-
dustrial development bonds.
Brokers and dealers who confine their transactions solely to exempted se-
curities do not need to register under section 15(a)(1). 3"° Transactions in
securities exempted from registration under the 1933 Act because of a trans-
action exemption do not exempt brokers or dealers from registration under
section 15 of the 1934 Act. Thus, a broker who proposed to engage exclu-
sively in transactions with respect to securities which were the subject of a
private placement was advised by the Commission staff that he would be
required to register as a broker or dealer.3 6'
B. Commercial Paper
Section 15(a)(1) specifically does not require registration for brokers or
dealers whose business is limited to transactions in commercial paper, bank-
ers' acceptances, or commercial bills. In addition, the term "security" is
defined in section 3(a)(10) to exclude notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or
bankers' acceptances with a maturity not exceeding nine months. 3 62 Thus,
brokers and dealers whose transactions involve exclusively short-term in-
struments, as opposed to long-term instruments with a maturity of greater
than nine months, are also absolved from the registration requirements.
These short-term instruments include commercial paper.3 63 The character-
357. Id.
358. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (June 4, 1975).
359. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29).
360.. Exchange Act § 15(a)(1).
361. Wertheim, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 79,286 (Feb. 12, 1973).
362. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
363. The Senate Report on the Securities Act of 1933, when discussing § 3(a)(3,), which
contains language comparable to the short-term instrument exemption of § 3(a)(10) of the
1934 Act made clear that these short term instruments included commercial paper. The report
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istics of the short-term commercial paper exclusion found in the 1934 Act
definition of a security have been construed as coextensive3 with the char-
acteristics of the short-term commercial paper exemption from registration
found in section 3(a)(3) 365 of the 1933 Act.
The term "commercial paper" is not defined in either the 1933 or the 1934
Act. However, the Commission described what it considers to be the char-
acteristics of exempted commercial paper in the discussion of section 3(a)(3)
of the 1933 Act:
The legislative history of the Act makes clear that section 3(a)(3)
applies only to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type
not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper issued
to facilitate well recognized types of current operational business
requirements and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Re-
serve banks.366
Thus, the Commission perceives commercial paper to be only those instru-
ments which are: (1) prime quality; (2) not ordinarily purchased by the pub-
lic; (3) used to finance operations rather than as start-up capital; and (4)
eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.367
The Commission's characterization of commercial paper has been adopted
by the Seventh Circuit. In Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,3 6 1 short-term
notes were held not to be exempt from the section 3(a)(10) definition of se-
curity because the notes, issued by an insolvent finance company, were not of
prime quality. Furthermore, because of the issuer's insolvency, the Sanders
court found it unlikely that the notes were used to facilitate current transac-
tions or were eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks. In addition,
the notes were found to be of a kind bought by the general public. Indeed,
the notes were offered and sold to forty-two members of the public.369
reads: "Notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and bankers' acceptances which are commercial paper
and arise out of current commercial, agricultural, or industrial transactions, and which are not
intended to be marketed to the public, are exempted." S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1933). Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act and § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act both have been read as
not exempting short-term instruments which are not commercial paper.
364. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933); see Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc.,
669 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1974).
365. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3).
366. Exchange Act Release No. 4412, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 2045 (Sept. 20, 1961).
367. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has found that under the Glass-Steagall
Act, commercial paper is to be construed as a security. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
368. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
369. Id. at 1079.
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C Mortgage Securities and Other Securities Exempted
by Commission Rule
In a limited number of instances, the Commission has exercised its
rulemaking authority under sections 3(a)(12) and 15(a)(2) of the 1934 Act to
exempt certain securities from the registration requirements of section 15(a)
of the Act.
1. Mortgage Securities
Under rule 3a12-1, 370 brokers who deal solely in mortgages or interests in
mortgages sold by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC) are exempt from broker-dealer registration requirements and
from the net capital provisions applying to broker-dealers. The mortgages
and mortgage interest sold by the FHLMC are originated by financial insti-
tutions whose deposits or accounts are insured by an agency of the United
States. The FHLMC purchases these mortgages from the financial institu-
tions in an effort to improve the liquidity of the market in residential mort-
gages. In adopting rule 3a12-1, the Commission noted that the FHLMC
contemplated requiring investors in its mortgage and mortgage interest pro-
grams to effect minimum purchases of at least $100,000. 3 1' Thus, buyers
would tend to be institutions. The Commission's rule, adopted in 1972, was
intended to facilitate the FHLMC's goal of establishing a liquid market in
residential mortgages. The Commission's willingness to abstain from regula-
tion in this area was prompted in part by the FHLMC's ability and desire to
regulate this field of securities and by the Commission's perception of a
"probable lack of small investor participation" in the area.3 72
In 1974, the Commission demonstrated an increased willingness to pro-
vide exemptions for brokers who deal in mortgage securities with the adop-
tion of rule 3a12-4. 37 This rule identifies mortgage securities as "exempted
securities" for purposes of broker-dealer registration and the net capital re-
quirement. The term mortgage security includes: "whole loan mortgages,"
e.g., an actual debt instrument secured by a mortgage; "aggregated whole
loan mortgages," e.g., two or more whole loan mortgages grouped together
and sold to one person; "participation interests," e.g., one of only two such
interests in either a whole loan or an aggregated whole loan mortgage with
the other interest retained by the originator of such participation interest; as
370. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-1 (1987), adopted in Exchange Act Release No. 9865, [1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,092 (Nov. 17, 1972).
371. Id. at 82,365.
372. Id.
373. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-4 (1987), adopted in Exchange Act Release No. 10,828, [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,803 (May 28, 1974).
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well as "commitments," e.g., a contract to purchase a whole loan or aggre-
gated whole loan mortgage or a participation interest which contract re-
quires full execution within two years.374
Unlike rule 3a12-1, the securities exempted under rule 3a12-4 are not lim-
ited to those sold by the FHLMC. The Commission recognized that
FHLMC had devised financial standards to be maintained by all participants
in its then-proposed automated trading system. 375 Not all mortgage brokers
and dealers, however, would participate in the FHLMC automated system
and thus might not be subject to financial responsibility oversight of the
FHLMC. Therefore, the Commission required that in order for the rule
3a12-4 exemption to apply to specific mortgage securities, the instrument
must have an unpaid balance of at least $50,000 and the security must not be
in default. 376 The Commission believed that these limitations would insure
the sophistication of the sellers of exempted mortgage securities.
Rule 3a12-4 exempts not merely whole loan mortgages but participation
interests and advance commitments in exempted securities as well. In its
release adopting rule 3a12-4, the Commission indicated that trading in com-
mitments then comprised half of the mortgage sales in secondary mort-
gages.377 Commitments serve to shift the long-term market risks, such as
those resulting from interest rate fluctuation. Trading in participation inter-
ests then amounted to over $10 billion annually. 378
The adopting release noted that the rule 3a12-4 exemption might be inap-
plicable if the mortgage security was sold as part of an investment con-
tract. 379 Thus, if the seller of the contract or someone other than the buyer
provides certain services specified in the promulgating release,38 ° the mort-
374. Id. at 84,176-77.
375. Id. at 84,177.
376. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-4(b) (1987).
377. See Exchange Act Release No. 10,828 supra note 373, at 84,177.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. The list of services which would suggest the existence of a service contract is:
1. Complete investigation and placing service.
2. Servicing collection, payments, foreclosures, etc.
3. Implied or express guarantee against loss at any time or providing a market for
the underlying security.
4. Making advances of funds to protect the security of the investment.
5. Acceptance of small uniform or continuous investments.
6. Implied or actual guarantee of specified yield or return.
7. Continual reinvestment of funds.
8. Payment of interest prior to actual purchase of the mortgage or trust note.
9. Providing for fractional interests in mortgages or deeds of trust (other than as
provided for by the rule).
10. Circumstances which necessitate complete reliance upon the seller.
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gage security might not be exempt because it would be viewed as an invest-
ment contract in which significant efforts were provided by someone other
than the investor. Merely providing collection, payment and foreclosure
services would not transform an otherwise exempt mortgage into an invest-
ment contract. This qualification of the no-externally-provided-services rule
is significant because these particular services are indeed often provided to
investors in mortgage securities.
Rule 3a12-4 was promulgated pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking
authority to exempt securities under section 3(a)(12), as well as its authority
to exempt brokers under section 15(a)(2).
2. Other Securities Exempted by Commission Rulemaking Authority
Under Section 3(a)(12)
The Commission has also chosen to exercise its rulemaking authority to
exempt securities in a limited number of other instances involving govern-
ment securities or government backed securities. In these instances, the
Commission has generally expressed its satisfaction in the alternate protec-
tion that will be afforded the trading market in these securities as a result of
the nature of the issuer of the subject security or of the trading market in
these securities, e.g., an institutionalized market, or as a result of protective
limitations written into the exempting rule.
Thus, the Commission has designated as exempted securities certain se-
curities, the income of which is guaranteed by a state or a political subdivi-
sion of a state.38 ' To qualify for exemption under rule 3a12-2, 382 not only
must the issuer's income be guaranteed to the extent necessary to pay inter-
est or dividends, but the business of the issuer must be managed by the state
or political subdivision or by a board appointed by the state or subdivision.
Also exempted pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking authority are
puts, options, straddles, or privileges which relate to United States govern-
ment securities, government guaranteed securities or securities issued by a
corporation in which the United States has a direct or an indirect interest.3a 3
In order to be exempt under rule 3a12-7,384 these derivative securities cannot
be traded on a national securities exchange, nor can quotations in these se-
11. Seller's selection of the mortgage or deed of trust for the investor.
Id.
381. Rule 3a12-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-2 (1987), adopted in Exchange Act Release No.
279 (June 19, 1935).
382. Id.
383. Rule 3a12-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-7 (1987), adopted in Exchange Act Release No.
20,625, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,488 (Feb. 6, 1984).
384. Id.
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curities be available in an automated quotation system. This restriction
makes it less likely that the derivative security will be traded by the public.
Also, in order to be exempt, the underlying security involved must represent
an obligation equal to or greater than $250,000.385 This dollar size qualifica-
tion was designed to insure that the investor in these over-the-counter op-
tions would continue to be the "professional/institutional type of business"
that the Commission indicated characterized the trading in these options. 38 6
Finally, under rule 3a12-8, the Commission has exempted futures in Brit-
ish and Canadian government securities. 387 To qualify for the exemption,
the future contract cannot be settled in the United States, nor may the un-
derlying debt instrument be traded in the United States. The requirement of
foreign delivery was designed to hamper the development of a domestic mar-
ket in the unregistered government bonds and to "deter utilization of future
contracts as if they were simply deferred-delivery cash transactions., 38 The
requirement that the underlying security not be traded in the United States
was intended to prevent the growth of an unregulated market in futures
which might impact upon a regulated market in the domestically traded un-
derlying security.
3. Securities Exempted by Commission Rulemaking Authority Under
Section 15(a)(2)
The Commission has rulemaking authority under section 15(a)(2) of the
1934 Act to exempt brokers from registration. 389 The Commission has used
its authority, however, under section 15(a)(2) to exempt securities as a
means of indirectly exempting brokers.3 90 The Commission has also used its
section 15(a)(2) authority to directly exempt brokers. The distinction be-
tween the two rulemaking activities is not necessarily significant. Under sec-
tion 15(a)(1), if a broker deals exclusively in exempted securities, the broker
is exempt from registration. a9 ' Hence, by exempting a class of securities in
which a broker exclusively deals, the Commission effectively exempts the
broker from registration. The Commission's rulemaking authority under
section 15(a)(2) of the Act, as well as section 3(a)(12) of the Act, is restricted
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Rule 3a12-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-8 (1987), adopted in Exchange Act Release No.
20,708, [1934-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,502 (March 2, 1984)
(amended in Exchange Act Release No. 23,423, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,015 (July 18, 1986)).
388. Id.
389. Exchange Act § 15(a)(2).
390. Id.
391. Id.
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in requiring a finding by the Commission that the exemption is "consistent
with the public interest and the protection of investors."'3 92 Also, under
both sections, the exemption may be conditioned or unconditioned. a93
As an example of the Commission using its broker exemption authority to
exempt securities, rule 15a-2 exempts shares in cooperative housing when
those shares are sold through a real estate broker licensed in the political
subdivision in which the cooperative is located.394 Also, rule 15a-3 exempts
from the operation of section 15(a) securities registered on a national securi-
ties exchange, or exempted from registration thereon, when they are bought
or sold off the floor of that exchange in a block by a specialist in order to
assist the specialist in maintaining a fair and orderly market.395
X. BANKS AND BROKER REGISTRATION
A. Bank Exclusion
Banks are effectively excluded from broker-dealer requirements by the
language of the 1934 Act.3 9 6 The definitions of both broker and dealer spe-
cifically exclude banks from the respective meanings of those terms.39 7 Since
a bank is neither a broker nor a dealer, the registration requirements of sec-
tion 15(a) do not apply to a bank.39 8
The term "bank" is defined by the 1934 Act:
392. Exchange Act § 15(a)(2).
393. To be consistent in its expanded application of § 15(a)(2), the Commission has cited
this section as additional evidence of its authority to exempt securities under § 3(a)(12). For
example, in promulgating rule 3a12-4 exempting mortgage securities, the Commission cited as
statutory authority § 15(a)(2) as well as §§ 3(a)(12) and 3(a)(23) (general rulemaking authority
provisions) and § 15(c)(3) (the financial responsibility provision). Exchange Act Release No.
10,828, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,803 (May 28, 1974).
394. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-2 (1987), adopted in Exchange Act Release No. 3963, 13 Fed.
Reg. 8204 (Dec. 22, 1948).
The Commission staff has relied upon rule 15a-2 as a basis for providing an exemption from
broker-dealer registration for real estate agents who were to sell shares in the Rivercross coop-
erative apartments to be built by the New York State Urban Development Corporation
(UDC). UDC had attempted to structure the shares in the cooperatives so that, pursuant to
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), they would not be viewed as
securities. The staff advised that even if the shares were deemed "securities," and if the real
estate agents were licensed in the political subdivision in which the cooperative was to be
located, the agents would be exempt under rule 15a-2. New York State Urban Dev. Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 2, 1975) (LEXIS, Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
395. 17 C.F.R. § 240 15a-3 (1987), adopted in Exchange Act Release No. 5790, 23 Fed.
Reg. 8097 (Oct. 21, 1958).
396. But see infra notes 439-79 (discussing Commission rule 3b-9 requirement of regulation
of banks).
397. For the statutory definition of the terms broker and dealer, see supra notes 22, 28.
398. But see infra text accompanying notes 439-79 regarding rule 3b-9.
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(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United
States,
(B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System,
(C) any other banking institution, whether incorporated or not,
doing business under the laws of any State or of the United States,
a substantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving
deposits or exercising fiduciary powers similar to those permitted
to national banks under section 11 (k) of the Federal Reserve Act,
as amended, and which is supervised and examined by State or
Federal authority having supervision over banks, and which is not
operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of this title, and
(D) a receiver, conservator, or other liquidating agent of any in-
stitution or firm included in clauses (A), (B), or (C) of this
paragraph.3 99
While clauses (A) and (B) are quite specific in scope, clause (C) is a broad
catchall definition that encompasses most banking institutions which either
accept deposits or exercise fiduciary powers and are regulated by a state or
federal authority.4" The section 3(a)(6) definition of bank is qualified by the
introductory phrase to section 3(a) which reads "unless the context other-
wise requires."' ' In addition, section 3(b)402 of the 1934 Act authorizes the
Commission to define terms used in the Act. The Commission relied upon
this qualifying phrase in sections 3(a) and its authority under 3(b) in the
promulgation of rule 3b-9, requiring broker-dealer registration of banks con-
ducting certain securities activities.40 3
While the legislative history of the bank exclusion is not extensive, the
Commission believes that in enacting the bank exclusion, Congress did not
contemplate that banks would engage in the kind of activities that would
typically subject them to broker-dealer registration.' The 1934 Act's stat-
399. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(6).
400. In a request for a no-action position in regard to its nonregistration as a broker-dealer,
an "international bank agency" argued that it was a bank and hence entitled to a bank exemp-
tion from registration since its American office was regulated and supervised in substantially
the same manner as a domestic bank chartered under state law. The Commission staff did not
challenge this position. Banque Sudamesis, SEC No-Action Letter (June 5, 1986) (LEXIS,
Federal Securities Library, No-Action File).
401. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a).
402. Id. § 78(c)(b).
403. See infra notes 439-79 and accompanying text.
404. The Commission believes that, in enacting the bank exclusion, the Congress did
not contemplate that banks would publicly solicit brokerage business, receive trans-
action-related compensation for providing brokerage services for trust, managing
agency or other accounts to which the bank provides advice, or deal in or underwrite
... securities other than exempted securities or municipal securities.
Exchange Act Release No. 20,357, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,445 (Nov. 8, 1983) [hereinafter Rule 3b-9 Proposing Release].
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utory definitions of broker and dealer containing the bank exclusions were
enacted one year after Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act.4°  The
Glass-Steagall Act was designed, among other things, to separate commer-
cial banking from investment banking. Sections 16 and 5(c) of that Act pro-
hibit national banks and state banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System from underwriting or trading in corporate securities. 4 6 In
addition, section 20 prohibits national and state member banks from affiliat-
ing with any organization "engaged principally" in the distribution of securi-
ties."°7 Further, under section 21 of that Act, individuals or businesses
engaged in underwriting are barred from engaging in banking as broadly
defined in that section.4" The Glass-Steagall Act does not bar banks from
buying and selling securities for the accounts of customers upon the cus-
tomer's order.' 9 While the Glass-Steagall Act did not totally bar banks
from the securities business, it did impose significant restrictions.4 10 Either
because of these restrictions or because of the lack of profitability of the
activity, banks were not significantly engaged in securities transaction serv-
ices for customers until the late 1970's. Bank brokerage activities were lim-
ited primarily to accommodation services for their customers or to
transactions that were incidental to the trust accounts supervised by the
banks. These transactions were conducted on a cost basis. In a 1977 report
on banking activities submitted by the Commission to Congress,4 ' the Com-
mission noted that banks handled relatively few customer securities orders
and typically did not advertise transaction services nor draw profits from
405. Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982))
[hereinafter the Glass-Steagall Act].
406. 12 U.S.C. § 24, 7 (1982) (barring national banks); id. § 335 (barring state member
banks).
407. 12 U.S.C. § 377.
408. Under § 21, organizations involved in underwriting are prohibited from engaging in
the business "of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a
passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt or upon request of the depositor." 12
U.S.C. § 378a(l).
409. 12 U.S.C. § 24, 7; id. § 335.
410. In a 1935 interpretation of the limitations imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act on na-
tional banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency indicated that national banks have
the right to purchase and sell stocks "solely upon the order, and for the account of," custom-
ers. However, that did "not mean that national banks may do a brokerage business." 1 Bull.
Comptroller Currency, No. 2, at 2-3 (Oct. 27, 1930), (portions reprinted in 4 Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 49,202 (1979)).
411. SEC, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. REPORT ON BANKS SECURITIES ACTIVITIES (Comm.
Print 1977) [hereinafter BANK REPORT]. The Bank Report was prepared in response to a
legislative directive adopted in the 1975 Securities Reform Act authorizing and directing the
Commission to study the degree to which persons excluded from the definition of "broker"
and "dealer" conduct a public customer securities business. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(e). Only banks
were excluded from the definition of both "broker and dealer."
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such services.412 As a consequence, the Commission refrained from seeking
to require banks to register as broker-dealers, 13 but noted that future
changes in market conditions could result in a change in Commission
position.414
B. Expansion of Bank Brokerage Activities
The degree of bank involvement in customer securities transactions began
to change significantly in the late 1970's. This trend continued into the
1980's. During this time, banks began to significantly increase their broker-
age activities, primarily as discount brokers, and to solicit brokerage custom-
ers from the general public. In 1985, the Commission stated that it believed
that "a thousand or more banks [were then] actively promoting brokerage
services to the public. '4 5 A representative study conducted by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency and cited by the Commission found that
fifty-five percent of the national banks surveyed were offering discount bro-
kerage services.41 6
The securities activities of banks are regulated by several governmental
bodies. The jurisdiction of these regulatory bodies is largely dependent upon
the nature of the banking institution to be regulated. State banks which are
members of the Federal Reserve System have their securities activities regu-
lated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board. State banks
which are not members of the Federal Reserve System are regulated by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Comptroller of the Currency
has jurisdiction over the securities activities of national banks. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System regulates bank holding companies.
Changes in the outlooks of these different regulatory boards, as well as sup-
porting judicial decisions, have permitted bank brokerage activities to
greatly expand. In January 1983, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System approved the application of BankAmerica Corporation to
acquire the parent company of the nation's largest discount brokerage firm,
Charles Schwab & Co. 4 "7 The Board's action was challenged by the Securi-
ties Industry Association and the Board's approval was ultimately upheld by
412. BANK REPORT, supra note 411, at 86.
413. Id. at 305.
414. Id. at 343.
415. Exchange Act Release No. 22,205, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,385 (July 1, 1985) [hereinafter
Rule 3b-9 Adopting Release].
416. Id.
417. Order of the Federal Reserve System Approving the Acquisition of Charles Schwab &
Co., by BankAmerica Corp., 69 Fed. Reserve Bulletin 105 (1983).
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the Supreme Court.4"' Consistent with its treatment of the BankAmerica
application, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System amended
its regulations to permit discount securities brokerage as a permissible non-
bank activity for bank holding companies.4 1 9
Discount brokerage services provided by a bank subsidiary, as opposed to
a bank holding company, also received approval by a governmental body in
the early 1980's. In 1982, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
approved the creation of a registered brokerage subsidiary for the Security
Pacific National Bank, holding that the discount brokerage activities of the
subsidiary would not violate the Glass-Steagall Act.4 20 The Comptroller's
decision was upheld by the District Court of the District of Columbia.42" '
However, the Court did find that bank brokerage offices were branches
within the meaning of the McFadden Act.42 ' Therefore, bank brokerage
offices would be subject to the same restrictions that the states impose on
bank branches.
4 23
The decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.4 24 In 1987, a unanimous United States
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the Comptroller
of the Currency in its determination that national bank offices which offer
only discount brokerage services are not branches pursuant to the McFad-
den Act.4 25 The majority opinion, written by Justice White, stated that "the
operation of a discount brokerage service is not a core banking function"
which would come under the restrictions of the McFadden Act.42 6 Thus,
bank brokerage offices do not come under the branching restrictions of the
McFadden Act.
In addition to the action taken by the Comptroller of the Currency, in
1982, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued a policy statement
418. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207
(1984).
419. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15) (1987).
420. Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the application by Security Pacific
National Bank to establish an operating subsidiary to be known as Securities Pacific Discount
Brokerage Services, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 99,284
(Aug. 26, 1982).
421. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh'g denied en banc, 765 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 790; cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986), aff'd in part & rev'd in
part, sub nor. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
422. 12 U.S.C. §§ 81, 36(f).
423. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. at 257-60.
424. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
425. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
426. Id. at 762.
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announcing that state nonmember banks are not prohibited by the Glass-
Steagall Act from acquiring or establishing subsidiary corporations to en-
gage in underwriting and brokerage activities.4 27 The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, which has primary regulatory authority over federally
chartered thrift institutions, in 1982 approved an application by several
thrift institutions to establish a joint brokerage service corporation which
would market its services in branch offices of the applicant savings and loan
institutions.4 28
Inroads were also made by banks in the area of commercial paper. In the
mid-1970's, Bankers Trust began selling commercial paper for several of its
corporate clients. Bankers Trust's activities were described as that of "an
advisor and agent to commercial paper issuers by advising each issuer of the
interest rates and maturities that institutional investors are likely to accept,
by soliciting prospective purchasers for commercial paper the client decides
to issue, and by placing the issue with the purchasers. 42 9 In response to a
petition filed by the Securities Industry Association and A.G. Becker, the
Federal Reserve Board ruled that Bankers Trust was not violating the Glass-
Steagall proscription barring the commercial banks from underwriting se-
curities since commercial paper was not a security for purposes of the Glass-
Steagall Act.43 ° The district court disagreed with the Board 431' but was re-
versed by the appellate court. 43 2 The Supreme Court reinstated the district
court's decision, determining that commercial paper is a security. 433 How-
ever, the case was remanded for a determination of whether the distribution
of commercial paper constituted underwriting.43 4 Upon remand, the Board
of Governors found that Bankers Trust's placement of commercial paper did
not violate the Glass-Steagall Act because it constituted the selling of a se-
427. FDIC, Statement of Policy on Applicability of Glass-Steagall Act to Securities Activi-
ties of Subsidiaries of Insured Nonmember Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,984 (1982). The FDIC has
adopted a rule which limiting certain aspects of permissible bank activities. 12 C.F.R. pts.
337.1-.11 (1987).
428. Establishment of Third-Tier Service Corporation to Conduct Certain Brokerage Ac-
tivities Federal Home Loan Bank Board, General Counsel Opinion, [Current Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 82,011 (May 1982).
429. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
430. Federal Reserve Systems, Statement Regarding Petitions to Initiate Enforcement Ac-
tion, Joint Appendix at 220 (26 Sept. 1980).
431. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 519 F. Supp. 602
(D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
432. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
433. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137.
434. Id.
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curity without recourse solely upon the order of customers and for the ac-
count of customers. 435 The federal district court reviewed the Board's
decision and found Bankers Trust's efforts constituted "underwriting" and
"distributing" and thus were in violation of section 21(a)(1) of the Glass-
Stegall Act.4 36 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit found that Bankers Trust placements of commercial paper
was consistent with the "literal requirements" of the Glass-Steagall Act and
was consistent with the "panoply of the Act's purposes. ' 4 37 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari for this matter in 1987.438
C. Rule 3b-9: A Checkered Career
1. Regulatory Background
By the mid-1980's, the Commission came to believe that brokerage activi-
ties and related promotional activities had changed substantially since the
Commission had published its Bank Report in 1977. The Commission
noted: "Members of the public are solicited through extensive and aggres-
sive advertising campaigns to become 'brokerage' customers of the bank.
Rather than merely providing accommodation services to existing custom-
ers, the services now promoted by banks ... are functionally indistinguish-
able from those offered by registered broker-dealers. 4 39 Propounding a
functional (rather than institutional) approach to regulation, the Commis-
sion opined that "consistent with the statutory objective of ensuring fair
competition among securities participants, all institutions providing broker-
age services should be subject to the same regulatory scheme that the Con-
gress set up for broker-dealers and charged the Commission with
administering."'  Consistent with its new perceptions, in 1983 the Com-
mission proposed rule 3b-9 for comment," 1 which excluded from the bank
exemption of sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Act, those banks conducting
435. Federal Reserve System, Statement Concerning Applicability of the Glass-Steagall
Act to the Commercial Paper Activities of Bankers Trust Co., Joint Appendex at 195 (June 4,
1985).
436. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F. Supp.
695 (D.D.C. 1986).
437. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
438. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 107 S.Ct. 3228
(1987).
439. Rule 3b-9 Adopting Release, supra note 415, at 808.
440. Functional regulation had been then recently endorsed by a task force headed by Vice
President George Bush. SEC TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUE
PRINT FOR REFORM: REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERV-
ICES 12, 91 (1984).
441. Rule 3b-9 Proposing Release, supra note 404.
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specified brokerage activities. This rule was adopted in 1985."2 The rule
442. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1987); Rule 3b-9 Adopting Release, supra note 415. Rule 3b-9
reads as follows:
The term "bank" as used in the definition of "broker" and "dealer" in Sections
3(a)(4) and (5) of the Act does not include a bank that:
(1) publicly solicits brokerage business for which it receives transaction-related
compensation, unless the bank enters into a contractual or other arrangement with a
broker-dealer registered under the Act pursuant to which the broker-dealer will offer
brokerage services on or off the premises of the bank, provided that:
(i) such broker-dealer is clearly identified as the person performing the bro-
kerage services;
(ii) bank employees perform only clerical and ministerial functions in con-
nection with brokerage transactions unless such employees are qualified as regis-
tered representatives pursuant to the requirements of the self-regulatory
organizations;
(iii) bank employees do not receive, directly or indirectly, compensation for
any brokerage activities unless such employees are qualified as registered repre-
sentatives pursuant to the requirements of the self-regulatory organizations; and
(iv) such services are provided by the broker-dealer on a basis in which all
customers are fully disclosed.
(1) directly or indirectly receives transaction-related compensation for providing
brokerage services for trust, managing agency or other accounts to which the bank
provides advice, provided, however, that this subsection shall not apply if the bank
executes transactions through a registered broker-dealer and:
(i) each account independently chooses the broker-dealer through which ex-
ecution is effected;
(ii) the bank's personnel do not receive, directly or indirectly, transaction-
related compensation or compensation based upon the number of accounts
choosing to use the registered broker-dealer; and
(iii) the brokerage services are provided by the broker-dealer on a basis in
which all customers are fully disclosed; or
(3) deals in or underwrites securities. (b) This rule shall not apply to any bank
that engages in one or more of the following activities only:
(1) effects transactions in exempted or municipal securities as defined in the Act
or in commercial paper, bankers; acceptances or commercial bills;
(2) effects no more than 1,000 transactions each year in securities other than
exempted or municipal securities as defined in the Act or in commercial paper, bank-
ers' acceptances or commercial bills;
(3) effects transactions for the investment portfolio of affiliated companies;
(4) effects transactions as part of a program for the investment or reinvestment of
bank deposit funds into any no-load open-end investment company registered pursu-
ant to the Investment Company Act of 1940 that attempts to maintain a constant net
asset value per share or has an investment policy calling for investment of at least
80% of its assets in debt securities maturing in thirteen months or less;
(5) effects transactions as part of any bonus, profit-sharing, pension, retirement,
thrift, savings, incentive, stock purchase, stock ownership, stock appreciation, stock
option, dividend reinvestment or similar plan for employees or shareholders of an
issuer or its subsidiaries;
(6) effects transactions pursuant to Sections 3(b), 4(2) and 4(6) of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the rules and regulations thereunder; or
(7) is subject to Section 15(e) of the Act.
(c) The Commission, upon written request, or upon its own motion, may exempt a
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was subsequently challenged in court and declared unlawful." 3 In explain-
ing its authority to adopt a rule which on its face denied an exclusion from
registration for banks which exclusion was provided by statute, the Commis-
sion looked to section 3(b) of the Act as well as the introductory phrase of
section 3(a). Section 3(b) provided the Commission with the "power by
rules and regulations to define technical, trade, accounting and other terms
used in [the 1934 Act]" insofar as such definitions are not inconsistent with
the provision of [the Act]." 4 " The introductory phrase of section 3(a) ad-
vises that the definitions of section 3 are controlling in interpreting the 1934
Act "unless the context otherwise requires."" The Commission argued
that rule 3b-9 defines activities of banks which the Commission believes to be
outside of the bank exclusion.446 The activities are beyond the bank exclu-
sion because they were not the normal activities engaged in by banks at the
time the 1934 Act was enacted." 7 In other words, today's operations of
banks are not representative of the context in which the 1934 Act was en-
acted. As a consequence, the context in which banks operate today requires
a definition of which bank activities are excludable from registration that is
different from the definition provided by the broad exclusion of the 1934
Act. In support of its use of the context analysis to determine the scope of
the bank exclusion, the Commission cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Marine Bank v. Weaver."' In Marine Bank the Supreme Court used the
introductory language of section 3(a) as a basis for its analyzing the context
of a securities transaction in determining whether a specific instrument falls
within the definition of a security. 49
bank, either unconditionally or on specific terms and condition, where the Commis-
sion determines that the bank's activities are not within the intended meaning and
purpose of this rule.
(d) For purposes of this section, the term "transaction-related compensation" shall
mean monetary profit to the bank in excess of cost recovery for providing brokerage
execution services.
Id.
443. See infra notes 450-79 and accompanying text.
444. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(b).
445. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a).
446. Rule 3b-9 Adopting Release, supra note 415, at 817.
447. The Commission cited to hearings on the predecessor bills to the Exchange Act which
contained "references to the limited nature of bank securities activities permitted at that time."
Id. at 817-18. The citations in the Adopting Release were to National Securities Exchange Act
of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86, 686-87 (1934); Hearings on Stock Exchange
Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 15-17,
at 6470-71 (1933).
448. 455 U.S. 551 (1982), cited in Rule 3b-9 Adopting Release, supra note 415, at 819.
449. 455 U.S. at 555-59.
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2. Operation of the Rule
The rule, as adopted, excluded from the term "bank," as found in the
definition of "broker" and "dealer," banks which engage in three identified
activities: (1) public solicitation of brokerage business for transaction related
compensation;45 (2) receipt of transaction related compensation for broker-
age services provided to trust, managing agency, or other accounts to which
the bank provides advice;45' and (3) dealing in or underwriting securities.452
Banks engaging in these activities, as significantly qualified by certain excep-
tions, had to register as broker-dealers or conduct these activities through a
subsidiary or affiliate registered as a broker-dealer. Alternatively, these
banks would be required to cease engaging in these activities.
In adopting rule 3b-9, the Commission expressed its hope that the rule
would eliminate disparities in the regulation of equivalent activities con-
ducted by banks and brokers. For example, registration of banks would sub-
ject bank personnel to the qualification examination procedures that all
persons associated with broker-dealers must undergo.453 Furthermore, bank
registration was expected to eliminate disparities in regulation concerning
content and review of advertisements. In addition, registration of banks
would result in oversight of the banks in order to insure compliance with
sales practice and financial responsibility regulations. Finally, the rule was
intended to bring banks within the structure of "rules and regulations
designed by the Commission and self-regulatory organizations to assure in-
vestor protection." '454 Upon the adoption of the rule, the Commission an-
nounced its intention to work closely with federal banking regulators in
order to avoid duplicative regulation.455
Shortly after rule 3b-9 was adopted, the American Bankers Association
(the Association) sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that the
rule was invalid, as well as an injunction prohibiting the SEC from enforcing
it. On a motion for summary judgment, in November 1985, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit on a bench ruling
held for the defendant and dismissed the Association's complaint.456 In No-
vember 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
450. Rule 3b-9(a)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9a(l) (1987).
451. Rule 3b-9(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9a(2) (1987).
452. Rule 3b-9(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9a(3) (1987).
453. Rule 3b-9 Adopting Release, supra note 415, at 810, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1987).
454. Id. at 810-11.
455. Id. at 819.
456. American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see 17 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1916 (Nov. 1, 1985).
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bia Circuit held that rule 3b-9 contravenes the intent of Congress.4 5 7 In
reversing the district court, the court of appeals ordered it to declare rule 3b-
9 unlawful and to enjoin its operation against member banks of the Associa-
tion. In December 1986, the Commission requested an en banc review by
the court of appeals of the three-judge panel decision,45 which was denied in
January 1987. The Commission did not request certiorari from the Supreme
Court. Before rule 3b-9 was struck down, 170 banks had complied with the
rule by registering brokerage subsidiaries and affiliates.459 Hundreds of
other banks were reported to have complied with the rule by establishing
networking relationships with registered brokers who effected transactions
for bank customers. 46
The court of appeals decision, which reversed the district court, was based
on three arguments. 461 In an opinion written by Chief Judge Patricia Wald,
the court first held that rule 3b-9 "directly conflicts" with the statutory lan-
guage of the 1934 Act.462 The court stated that sections 3(a)(4) 463 and
3(a)(5) 464 of the 1934 Act clearly exclude banks from the definition of both
broker and dealer. Rule 3b-9 was invalid, however, insofar as it required
registration of some banks as broker-dealers by defining the term "bank" to
exclude those banks that engage in brokerage business for profit.465 Judge
Wald found that the rule-generated definition of bank was inconsistent with
the statutory definition of bank in the 1934 Act, which does not contain any
exception for a bank engaging in brokerage activities for profit.466 To this
end, the court discovered "no ambiguity or imprecision" in the statutory
definition of the term "bank. 467
457. American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
458. Id.; see 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 17 (Jan. 2, 1987).
459. Ingersoll, SEC Will Seek Authority from Congress to Regulate Bank Brokerage Activi-
ties, Wall St. J., April 30, 1987, at 6, col. 2-3.
460. Id.
461. American Bankers Ass'n, 804 F.2d at 740.
462. Id. at 744.
463. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4).
464. Id. § 78c(a)(5).
465. American Bankers Ass'n, 804 F.2d at 743. Actually, rule 3b-9 did not exclude from
the definition of banks only those banks that engaged in the brokerage business for profit. Two
of the three categories of banks excluded from the definition, banks that solicited brokerage
business and banks that managed accounts, were banks which received transaction-related
compensation. Rule 3b-9(a)(l) to (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9a(l)-(2) (1987). The third category
of banks, banks that underwrite securities, was not defined in terms of compensation. Rule 3b-
9(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b(3) (1987). In all likelihood, however, the third category of bank
would be operating as an underwriter only for profit. Consequently, Judge Wald's characteri-
zation would not be inaccurate.
466. American Bankers Ass'n, 804 F.2d at 743-44.
467. Id. at 744.
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The court of appeals also held that rule 3b-9 was inconsistent with con-
gressional intent. Judge Wald stated that "Congress intended to preclude
SEC regulation of institutions meeting the statutory definition of 'bank' in
order to avoid duplicative regulation. '4 68 She rejected the SEC's argument
that Congress excluded banks from the Commission's regulation of brokers
merely because it believed that banks would be precluded from engaging in
brokerage activities for nonbanking customers by the Glass-Steagall Act.
4 69
Judge Wald reasoned that in order for the Commission's argument to be
valid, an assumption unsupported by the legislative history must be made.470
The assumption is that, had Congress foreseen how the Comptroller of the
Currency and the courts would interpret the Glass-Steagall Act, it would not
have exempted banks from broker-dealer regulation.471 Judge Wald found it
"entirely possible" that even if Congress had anticipated the more liberal
interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act, it still might have chosen "to leave
banks in the hands of bank regulators alone, so as not to subject banks to the
double-whammy of additional federal oversight., 472 The fact that Congress
did not place banks under the regulatory umbrella of the Commission in the
1975 amendments, even after administrative interpretations of the Glass-
Steagall Act were undergoing revision, further demonstrated lack of con-
gressional intent to authorize the SEC to regulate banks.473
Finally, the court of appeals held that the clause indicating "unless the
context otherwise requires," which precedes all definitions in the 1934 Act,
does not refer to "out-of-Act market or regulatory circumstances," but only
to textual inconsistencies.474 Judge Wald stated that, in Marine Bank,475 the
Supreme Court "suggest[ed] that the context clause may authorize an
agency or court to take account of outside circumstances in construing a
term defined in the 1934 Act."'476 She found, however, that the Supreme
Court's "observation" was "unnecessary to the Court's holding and profer-
red only in a passing reference with no explanation or discussion. ' 477 Judge
Wald also stated that the legislative history of the Act suggests that the term
"context" was used as a term synonymous with "text., 47 ' Thus, the Com-
468. Id. at 744-45.
469. Id. at 748-49.
470. Id. at 749.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 749-50.
474. Id. at 753.
475. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
476. American Bankers Ass'n, 804 F.2d at 753.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 754.
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mission could not look to circumstances external to the statute to interpret
defined terms found in the 1934 Act. In conclusion, Judge Wald advised the
Commission as to how to obtain authority to regulate banks engaging in the
brokerage business. Recognizing "the dramatic changes in the nature of fi-
nancial institution and market practices in the last fifty years," she suggested
that Congress may choose to reexamine the Glass-Steagall Act and the Se-
curities Exchange Act.47 9
The Commission's own evaluation of its alternatives following the ruling
by the court of appeals on rule 3b-9 was not dissimilar from the advice of-
fered by Judge Wald. Rather than request certiorari from the Supreme
Court, the Commission, in May 1987, submitted to Congress a legislative
package proposing to include banks within the 1934 Act definition of broker
and dealer. 48 0 The proposed amendments to section 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of
the 1934 Act would modify the exception granted to banks from the defini-
tions of broker and dealer. The proposed amendments would allow the
Commission to accomplish what it sought to accomplish under rule 3b-9.
Under the proposal, a bank would no longer be excluded from the definitions
of broker or dealer if the bank: (1) publicly solicited brokerage business; (2)
received transaction-related compensation for brokerage services provided to
advisory accounts supervised by the bank; or (3) dealt in or underwrote se-
curities. 481 The proposed legislation would also introduce a new section 3(e)
to the 1934 Act which would allow the Commission to exempt banks by
rule, regulation or order from the definition of broker or dealer.482 This
provision would permit the Commission to replicate by rule the numerous
express exceptions from the redefinition of bank that existed in rule 3b-9.
Finally, the proposed legislation would also amend section 15(a) of the 1934
Act to require a bank to establish a separate entity to conduct its securities
activities.48 3 Such a requirement, unlike the provisions of rule 3b-9, would
prevent a bank which chose to operate itself as a registered broker-dealer
from being required to comply with potentially conflicting regulatory re-
gimes. The Commission indicated that requiring a bank to establish a sepa-
rate securities entity would serve to diminish regulatory conflicts. 484 Were
the bank itself to register as a broker-dealer, it would be compelled to com-
479. Id. at 755.
480. The legislative package was approved by the Commission on April 29, 1987 and it was
submitted to Congress on May 4, 1987. The package was submitted to Vice President Bush,
Senators Proxmire, Roegle, Garn, and Armstrong, and Congressmen Wright, Dingell, Lent,
Markey, and Rinaldo [hereinafter Legislative Proposal].
481. Legislative Proposal, supra note 480, at 2.
482. Id. at 14.
483. Id. at 17.
484. Id.
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ply with the Commission's net capital rule requirements which might differ
from capital requirements imposed by bank regulators. In addition, in the
event of liquidation, a bank registered as a broker-dealer might be subject to
the liquidation procedures of both the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion as well as the Securities Insurance Protection Corporation.
The proposed legislation did not include a provision, as was found in rule
3b-9, that would automatically exempt from registration banks that estab-
lished a "networking" arrangement with a registered broker-dealer. The
Commission indicated, however, that it anticipated using the exemptive
rulemaking power proposed in the legislation to allow banks that entered
into networking arrangements to avoid registration as broker-dealers.4 85
In proposing these amendments, the Commission advised that it was seek-
ing to "ensure that all entities engaged in the securities business will be sub-
ject to the regulatory scheme for broker-dealers that Congress has
established and charged the Commission with administering." '48 6 The pro-
posed amendments are designed to achieve a functional regulation of securi-
ties activities rather than regulation based upon industry classification. It is
not at all clear, however, that Congress is prepared to engage in either a
piecemeal or a total legislative review of its legislation regulating the separa-
tion between banking and securities activities. Without that legislative re-
view, the functional approach to regulating banks in the brokerage business
will continue to lie dormant.
XI. CONCLUSION
After plowing through a primer on broker-dealer registration, it is difficult
not to be overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of questions that must
be explored in order to determine when broker-dealer registration is neces-
sary. Because the regulatory function of broker-dealer registration is critical
to the smooth operation of the securities markets, it is incumbent upon regu-
lators to make the broker-dealer registration process as comprehensible as
possible for those who must comply with its dictates.
Unfortunately, such questions as "who is a broker-dealer" and "which
broker dealers should be exempt from registration" do not promote simple
responses. Consequently, the regulatory system governing these matters will
be equally as complex. The broker-dealer regulatory system must insure
that those who conduct a business exposing the public to the risks inherent
in a broker-dealer operation will be required to register as broker-dealers.
Concomitantly, the system should not burden businesspeople with the re-
485. Id. at 15.
486. Id. at 1.
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quirements of broker-dealer registration if their businesses do not generate
the risks to the public associated with broker-dealer operations.
When the regulatory system can be made more approachable, it should be
modified. The practice of relying heavily upon no-action letters to provide
advice to potential brokers must be revisited. No-action letters are often
confusing in their information and they are difficult to systematically review
for guidance. The staff must make greater efforts to identify important as-
pects of fact patterns discussed in no-action letters. Inconsistencies among
different staff no-action responses must be identified and explained. Expla-
nation should also be provided when inconsistencies exist between the facts
described in inquiry letters and the facts of response letters. To avoid the
necessity of researching voluminous no-action letters, principles that have
gained acceptability in no-action letters should routinely be collected and
disseminated in interpretive releases and ultimately in rules.
Even if the use of no-action letters in regard to broker-dealer registration
is reduced or simplified, the determination of who needs to register will re-
main complex. The answers will not always be black and white; a myriad of
statutes, rules, cases, interpretive releases and no-action letters governing
matters including registration requirements, exemptions, and definition of
securities will have to be consulted. This primer is intended merely as a
basic guide to assist in making a more manageable determination of who
needs to register as a broker-dealer.
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